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| 书 名： | 市场和政府：运输经济理论与应用 | ||||
| 英 文 名： | MARKETS AND GOVERNMENTS Transport Economic Theory and Applications | ||||
| 作 者： | 〔荷〕伊瑞克·维尔赫夫（ErikVerhoef） 王雅璨 胡雅梅 编著 | ||||
| I S B N： | 978-7-5201-5017-0 | ||||
| 关 键 词： | 运输经济学 高等学校 教材 | ||||
| 出版时间： | 2019年11月 | ||||
中文摘要
本书作为突出问题导向的运输经济学教材，并没有对运输业及经济学原理进行概括性的介绍，而是直接聚焦于运输经济领域的市场失灵问题。它系统阐述了如何运用标准的微观经济学与福利经济学工具分析这一运输经济学的核心问题，并进一步展示如何从这些分析中推导出政策结论。
本书旨在系统地应用经济理论分析现实的交通问题。它对市场与政府的关系进行了深入的考察，借助外部效应、自然垄断、寡头垄断等经济理论探讨交通市场失灵问题。本书关注如下问题：为什么有些情况下自由市场并不能有效运转？运输市场存在着哪些导致市场失灵的因素？这些因素如何影响个人和企业的运输选择行为？政府如何应对这些失灵问题？如何运用经济方法（特别是定价机制）识别各种潜在的干预方法是否有效？最新的行为经济学理论如何应用于运输问题？等等。
本书的内容紧紧围绕着运输经济领域的实际问题，融合了国际运输经济领域的最新研究成果，反映了该领域国际研究的重点、热点与难点。
文章列表
本书共分七章。第一章解释了从经济学视角来看为什么需要，以及如何将拥堵道路看作一个具体的常见的市场失灵现象，这种现象是由外部成本引起的。本章将讨论这类市场的自由市场均衡结果，并将其与经济最优均衡结果进行比较。进而，还将讨论如何通过定价政策来实现这种最优结果。最后，本章分析了一个看起来存在矛盾的重要问题——为什么经济有效（福利最大化）的政策在民主社会中往往难以实施。
第二章进一步探讨了一些实际的交通问题，它们可能会使得人们无法完全地直接将理论模型的洞见运用到实际的政策制定中去。本章探讨为什么在面对交通拥堵时，仅用道路定价这种“经济”手段通常不足以达到完全最优，主要借助需求导向的定价政策和供给导向的道路容量政策之间的相互作用来进行阐释。本章还将讨论所谓“次优”定价的种种经济细节，这种定价往往更符合实际，但严格来说并不完美。
第三章将考虑网络运营商追求的其他不同目标如何影响其使用的定价规则，以及由此产生的市场结果。首先，本章关注以下问题：道路私有化是不是一个经济上有吸引力的方法，可以用来应对道路拥堵问题。本章将说明为什么私有化并不总是应对低效率的“神奇疗法”，这有时与人们的信条背道而驰。其次，本章说明公共机构也可能追求与整体社会期望不相符的目标。特别的，本章讨论税收竞争的主题，当不同政府代表不同人群而税基重叠时，有可能会出现这种竞争。由于运输显然涉及移动的行为人，因此，税收竞争变得重要的可能性是远远超出想象的。
第四章考察交通运输中除外部性以外的其他类型的市场失灵，这类市场失灵是市场势力造成的。本章将讨论自然垄断（铁路领域）和寡头垄断（航空领域）的实际案例。笔者既重视识别那些造成市场势力的根本经济原因，也重视推演经济政策的含义。鉴于此，这些市场中的实际政策被加以评估，如简要讨论荷兰在铁路政策方面的经验和各国在航空市场放松管制方面的经验。
第五章进行实证研究，讨论对没有可观测市场价格的物品进行经济赋值的实证方法，以出行时间为例。
第六章探讨政府为评估潜在投资项目的可行性而采用的一项重要技术——成本—效益分析法。这个方法尽管看起来简单，但是在执行过程中存在很多陷阱，经济学家在实际运用中应注意这一点。
第七章探讨行为经济学的发展与其在交通出行领域的应用，分析人们出行行为中可能存在的偏差，探讨如何将行为经济学理论运用到交通政策的制定中。
,AbstractEN:This book is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter explains why it is needed from the perspective of economics, and how to regard congestion road as a specific common market failure phenomenon, which is caused by external costs. In this chapter, we will discuss the free market equilibrium result of this kind of market and compare it with the economic optimal equilibrium result. Furthermore, we will discuss how to achieve this optimal result through pricing policy. Finally, this chapter analyzes an important question that seems to be contradictory - why is it difficult to implement economically effective (welfare maximization) policies in democratic societies. Chapter 2 further discusses some practical traffic problems, which may make it impossible for people to directly apply the insights of theoretical models to actual policy-making. This chapter discusses why in the face of traffic congestion, the "economic" means of road pricing alone is usually not enough to achieve complete optimization. It is mainly explained by the interaction between demand-oriented pricing policy and supply-oriented road capacity policy. This chapter also discusses the economic details of the so-called "suboptimal" pricing, which is often more realistic but not strictly perfect. The third chapter will consider how the different goals pursued by network operators affect the pricing rules they use and the resulting market results. First of all, this chapter focuses on the following questions: is road privatization an economically attractive way to deal with road congestion. This chapter will explain why privatization does not always deal with inefficient "magic cures," which sometimes run counter to the creed. Secondly, this chapter shows that public institutions may also pursue goals that are inconsistent with the expectations of the whole society. In particular, this chapter discusses the theme of tax competition, which may occur when different governments represent different groups of people with overlapping tax bases. Since transport obviously involves the mobile actor, the possibility of tax competition becoming important is far beyond imagination. Chapter four examines the market failures in transportation except externalities, which are caused by market forces. This chapter will discuss practical cases of natural monopoly (railway sector) and oligopoly (aviation sector). The author not only attaches importance to identifying the fundamental economic causes of market power, but also attaches importance to deducing the meaning of economic policies. In view of this, practical policies in these markets are evaluated, such as a brief discussion on the experience of the Netherlands in railway policy and the experience of various countries in deregulation of the aviation market. Chapter 5 makes an empirical study, discusses the empirical method of economic valuation of goods without observable market price, taking travel time as an example. Chapter 6 discusses the cost-benefit analysis method, an important technology adopted by the government to evaluate the feasibility of potential investment projects. Although this method seems simple, there are many pitfalls in the implementation process. Economists should pay attention to this point in practical application. Chapter 7 discusses the development of behavioral economics and its application in the field of transportation, analyzes the possible deviations in people's travel behavior, and discusses how to apply behavioral economics theory to the formulation of transportation policies.
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,AbstractEN:This chapter first explains that road congestion can be seen as a market failure problem caused by "external costs"; secondly, it compares the results of free market equilibrium and economic optimal equilibrium of road use; thirdly, it discusses how to achieve economic optimal equilibrium through congestion pricing policy, and then compares the efficiency of price policy and non price policy; finally, it explains why the economy is in an economic state Optimal policies are often difficult to implement in a democratic society.
,KeyWords:564347,564348,564349,111932,EKeyWords:564350,51666,564351,111933,SubjectWords:,LiteratureId:11756293,Fileref:null,OrderFlag:0,IsLeaf:N,PubDate:null,FindDate:null,IssueDate:null,DocType:null,ProductSeries:null,Doi:null,InstanceID:0,MinNodeSearch:Y,XmlID:b120191102X20183246001_002,Prop1:null,Prop2:null,Prop3:null,prop4:null,AddUser:admin,AddTime:2020-07-29 13:48:30.0,ModifyUser:Admin,ModifyTime:2021-11-03 04:38:13.0,HitCount:37,ShowType:putong,LogoID:0,PdfID:11756296,DownCount:9,AuthorInfos:,BookPublishDate:2019-11-01 00:00:00.0,SearchTitle:作为外部效应的交通拥堵,ISBN:978-7-5201-5017-0,BookTitle:市场和政府：运输经济理论与应用,BookStatus:7,AllowDownload:Y,BookVersionNum:null,researchorg:null,CopyRightDate:null,ExcellentPeriod:null,PrizeLevel:null,IsExcellence:null,ContentClass:null,IsDisabled:N,SearchTitle_2:作为外部效应的交通拥堵,_RowNo:5本章主要研究道路拥堵问题在理论上的最优解决方案与在实践中的各种次优解决方案。首先考虑拥堵定价与容量选择可以同时完美决策的理论情形。“自我融资”定理表明，在一定技术假设下，从最优拥堵定价中获得的收益将恰好可以覆盖提供最优容量所需的成本。不过，由于现实中的种种约束，最优方案通常无法实施。其次考虑现实中的次优定价，包括无法区分所有车辆的次优拥堵收费和无法对所有道路收费的付费通道收费。最后简要讨论了停车收费、燃油税、警戒线收费和年牌照费等次优收费方案的利弊。
,AbstractEN:This chapter mainly studies the optimal solutions in theory and various suboptimal solutions in practice. Firstly, we consider the theoretical case that congestion pricing and capacity selection can make perfect decisions at the same time. The "self financing" theorem shows that under certain technical assumptions, the revenue from the optimal congestion pricing can cover the cost of providing the optimal capacity. However, due to various constraints in reality, the optimal scheme can not be implemented. Secondly, we consider the sub optimal pricing in reality, including the sub optimal congestion charge which can not distinguish all vehicles and the toll channel which cannot charge all roads. Finally, the advantages and disadvantages of sub optimal charging schemes, such as parking charge, fuel tax, warning line charge and annual license fee, are briefly discussed.
,KeyWords:564352,564353,564354,564355,EKeyWords:564350,545091,564356,533206,SubjectWords:,LiteratureId:11756299,Fileref:null,OrderFlag:0,IsLeaf:N,PubDate:null,FindDate:null,IssueDate:null,DocType:null,ProductSeries:null,Doi:null,InstanceID:0,MinNodeSearch:Y,XmlID:b120191102X20183246001_003,Prop1:null,Prop2:null,Prop3:null,prop4:null,AddUser:admin,AddTime:2020-07-29 13:48:30.0,ModifyUser:Admin,ModifyTime:2021-11-03 04:38:13.0,HitCount:21,ShowType:putong,LogoID:0,PdfID:11756303,DownCount:10,AuthorInfos:,BookPublishDate:2019-11-01 00:00:00.0,SearchTitle:道路定价：从理论到实践,ISBN:978-7-5201-5017-0,BookTitle:市场和政府：运输经济理论与应用,BookStatus:7,AllowDownload:Y,BookVersionNum:null,researchorg:null,CopyRightDate:null,ExcellentPeriod:null,PrizeLevel:null,IsExcellence:null,ContentClass:null,IsDisabled:N,SearchTitle_2:道路定价：从理论到实践,_RowNo:6本章首先讨论除了社会福利效用最大化的“仁慈的独裁者”之外，基于其他目标的道路拥堵收费方法；其次讨论道路完全私有化的组织方式的效率问题；最后讨论如何通过拥堵定价政策实现基于其他目标的均衡，进而比较社会总剩余最大化政策与基于其他目标的拥堵收费政策之间的效率。本章解释了为何道路私有化、将一切交给市场并不是万能的解决方案，也讨论了拥堵收费牵涉的税收（收费）竞争问题，并点明该理论适用于更广的领域。
,AbstractEN:This chapter first discusses the road congestion pricing method based on other goals except for the benevolent dictator who maximizes the social welfare utility; secondly, it discusses the efficiency of the organization mode of road complete privatization; finally, it discusses how to achieve the equilibrium based on other objectives through congestion pricing policy, and then compares the policy of maximizing social total surplus with that based on other objectives Efficiency between congestion pricing policies. This chapter explains why road privatization and leaving everything to the market is not a panacea. It also discusses the tax competition involved in congestion pricing, and points out that the theory can be applied to a wider range of fields.
,KeyWords:564357,564358,564359,EKeyWords:564360,564361,149513,SubjectWords:,LiteratureId:11756306,Fileref:null,OrderFlag:0,IsLeaf:N,PubDate:null,FindDate:null,IssueDate:null,DocType:null,ProductSeries:null,Doi:null,InstanceID:0,MinNodeSearch:Y,XmlID:b120191102X20183246001_004,Prop1:null,Prop2:null,Prop3:null,prop4:null,AddUser:admin,AddTime:2020-07-29 13:48:31.0,ModifyUser:Admin,ModifyTime:2021-11-03 04:38:13.0,HitCount:20,ShowType:putong,LogoID:0,PdfID:11756309,DownCount:4,AuthorInfos:,BookPublishDate:2019-11-01 00:00:00.0,SearchTitle:基于其他目标的道路拥堵收费方法,ISBN:978-7-5201-5017-0,BookTitle:市场和政府：运输经济理论与应用,BookStatus:7,AllowDownload:Y,BookVersionNum:null,researchorg:null,CopyRightDate:null,ExcellentPeriod:null,PrizeLevel:null,IsExcellence:null,ContentClass:null,IsDisabled:N,SearchTitle_2:基于其他目标的道路拥堵收费方法,_RowNo:7本章首先讨论市场势力问题是市场失灵的重要原因；其次讨论随着垄断程度的加深，在垄断市场与寡头市场上市场势力的来源、企业拥有市场势力时的行为；再次讨论为了管制市场势力，政府可以采取哪些具体的干预手段，这些手段相应的福利效应；最后引入两个重要的交通运输市场——自然垄断的铁路运输市场和通常具有寡头垄断结构的航空运输市场，讨论了市场势力的来源、影响及应对。
,AbstractEN:This chapter first discusses that market power is an important cause of market failure; secondly, it discusses the source of market power in monopoly market and oligopoly market, and the behavior of enterprises when they own market power with the deepening of monopoly degree; thirdly, it discusses the specific intervention measures that the government can take to control market power and the corresponding welfare effect of these means; finally, it introduces two aspects This paper discusses the source, influence and Countermeasures of market power in railway transportation market and air transportation market with oligopoly structure.
,KeyWords:351095,60373,564362,143516,EKeyWords:95375,51666,564346,143517,SubjectWords:,LiteratureId:11756311,Fileref:null,OrderFlag:0,IsLeaf:N,PubDate:null,FindDate:null,IssueDate:null,DocType:null,ProductSeries:null,Doi:null,InstanceID:0,MinNodeSearch:Y,XmlID:b120191102X20183246001_005,Prop1:null,Prop2:null,Prop3:null,prop4:null,AddUser:admin,AddTime:2020-07-29 13:48:31.0,ModifyUser:Admin,ModifyTime:2021-11-03 04:38:13.0,HitCount:27,ShowType:putong,LogoID:0,PdfID:11756314,DownCount:8,AuthorInfos:,BookPublishDate:2019-11-01 00:00:00.0,SearchTitle:运输市场势力,ISBN:978-7-5201-5017-0,BookTitle:市场和政府：运输经济理论与应用,BookStatus:7,AllowDownload:Y,BookVersionNum:null,researchorg:null,CopyRightDate:null,ExcellentPeriod:null,PrizeLevel:null,IsExcellence:null,ContentClass:null,IsDisabled:N,SearchTitle_2:运输市场势力,_RowNo:8本章首先解释出行时间节约价值的经济学内涵及意义；其次，从短期和长期两个维度，构建出行时间节约价值的理论模型；再次，介绍随机效用理论，在此基础上，构建出行时间节约价值的估计模型；最后，介绍了荷兰关于出行时间节约价值的最新研究。
,AbstractEN:This chapter firstly explains the economic connotation and significance of travel time saving value; secondly, it constructs the theoretical model of travel time saving value from two dimensions of short-term and long-term; thirdly, it introduces the random utility theory, and on this basis, constructs the estimation model of travel time saving value; finally, it introduces the latest research on travel time saving value in Holland.
,KeyWords:564363,564364,108849,564365,6421,EKeyWords:564366,564367,50033,564368,8234,SubjectWords:,LiteratureId:11756317,Fileref:null,OrderFlag:0,IsLeaf:N,PubDate:null,FindDate:null,IssueDate:null,DocType:null,ProductSeries:null,Doi:null,InstanceID:0,MinNodeSearch:Y,XmlID:b120191102X20183246001_006,Prop1:null,Prop2:null,Prop3:null,prop4:null,AddUser:admin,AddTime:2020-07-29 13:48:31.0,ModifyUser:Admin,ModifyTime:2021-11-03 04:38:13.0,HitCount:31,ShowType:putong,LogoID:0,PdfID:11756321,DownCount:8,AuthorInfos:,BookPublishDate:2019-11-01 00:00:00.0,SearchTitle:出行时间节约价值的估算,ISBN:978-7-5201-5017-0,BookTitle:市场和政府：运输经济理论与应用,BookStatus:7,AllowDownload:Y,BookVersionNum:null,researchorg:null,CopyRightDate:null,ExcellentPeriod:null,PrizeLevel:null,IsExcellence:null,ContentClass:null,IsDisabled:N,SearchTitle_2:出行时间节约价值的估算,_RowNo:9政府在进行投资决策时，需要从社会的角度对政策的利弊进行全面衡量，而成本—效益分析是最常用的政策评价方法。本章首先介绍成本—效益分析的一些基础概念，包括计算公式、判断原则、分析步骤以及对时间价值的考虑等。成本—效益分析中效益的衡量是难点，需要用“一半规则”计算项目的效益。项目效益会有扩散效应，需注意不应重复计算。除了前面提到的直接效益，项目还会有外部性，主要表现为外部成本，这也应该在计算项目效益时加以考虑。本章最后谈到了成本—效益分析在实践中遇到的一些常见问题。
,AbstractEN:When the government makes investment decisions, it needs to comprehensively measure the advantages and disadvantages of policies from the perspective of society, and cost-benefit analysis is the most commonly used policy evaluation method. This chapter first introduces some basic concepts of cost-benefit analysis, including calculation formula, judgment principle, analysis steps and consideration of time value. It is difficult to measure the benefit in cost-benefit analysis, so it is necessary to use "half rule" to calculate project benefit. The project benefit will have the diffusion effect, which should not be calculated repeatedly. In addition to the direct benefits mentioned above, the project will also have externalities, mainly manifested as external costs, which should also be taken into account when calculating project benefits. At the end of this chapter, some common problems of cost-benefit analysis in practice are discussed.
,KeyWords:4699,34895,564369,564370,EKeyWords:4702,89726,564371,564372,SubjectWords:,LiteratureId:11756324,Fileref:null,OrderFlag:0,IsLeaf:N,PubDate:null,FindDate:null,IssueDate:null,DocType:null,ProductSeries:null,Doi:null,InstanceID:0,MinNodeSearch:Y,XmlID:b120191102X20183246001_007,Prop1:null,Prop2:null,Prop3:null,prop4:null,AddUser:admin,AddTime:2020-07-29 13:48:31.0,ModifyUser:Admin,ModifyTime:2021-11-03 04:38:13.0,HitCount:76,ShowType:putong,LogoID:0,PdfID:11756327,DownCount:17,AuthorInfos:,BookPublishDate:2019-11-01 00:00:00.0,SearchTitle:成本—效益分析,ISBN:978-7-5201-5017-0,BookTitle:市场和政府：运输经济理论与应用,BookStatus:7,AllowDownload:Y,BookVersionNum:null,researchorg:null,CopyRightDate:null,ExcellentPeriod:null,PrizeLevel:null,IsExcellence:null,ContentClass:null,IsDisabled:N,SearchTitle_2:成本—效益分析,_RowNo:10本章首先介绍了行为经济学的发展与其在交通出行领域的应用概况；其次从有限理性、前景理论、社会偏好三个维度出发探讨人们出行行为中可能存在的偏差；最后探讨了如何将助推等行为经济学理论运用到交通政策的制定中。
,AbstractEN:This chapter first introduces the development of behavioral economics and its application in the field of transportation; secondly, it discusses the possible deviation in people's travel behavior from three dimensions of bounded rationality, prospect theory and social preference; finally, it discusses how to apply the behavioral economics theory such as boost to the formulation of transportation policy.
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