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经济社会学研究 第三辑

书 名: 经济社会学研究 第三辑
英 文 名: Chinese Economic Sociology Research (Vol.3)
作 者:  刘世定 张翔 王水雄
I S B N: 978-7-5097-9047-2
关 键 词:  经济社会学 研究报告 中国
出版日期: 2016-05-01

中文摘要

《经济社会学研究》第三辑以博弈论的社会学化以及金融社会学为主题,收录了九篇高质量的论文。“博弈论的社会学化”方面的七篇论文,从宏观到微观,从具体到抽象,从实践到理论,分别涉及国际关系、政企关系、政府内部上下级关系、公司内部治理结构、村庄内部就“调地”形成的讨价还价方式与过程、认同与情境定义对博弈结果的重要意义,以及“孙子兵法”与“谢林战略”在社会博弈论意义上的比较。第八篇论文探讨的是社会倾斜系统中的关键信息对个人决策所起的作用。它一方面可被看作对多人博弈的探讨,另一方面也可被看作转向金融社会学研究的理论准备。第九篇论文探讨了信息技术革命推动下的“专业技术-金融资本主义”对社会结构的影响。

更多“金融社会学”研究方面的论文,将在第四辑刊出,敬请期待。

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文章列表

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CommonID:DIR_17143312,ID:7143312,SiteID:14,Type:chapter,Code:null,ParentId:0,InnerCode:196793,name:东道国政党政治下的劳资博弈:以中色集团在赞比亚的遭遇为例11470717,ShortName:,SubName:,EnTitle:The Capital-labor Conflict under Party Politics in Host Country:A Case Study about CNMC’s Experience in Zambia,EnShortTitle:,EnSubTitle:,Level:0,BookId:7143306,AbstractCH:

劳资冲突是中国企业海外发展面临的主要风险之一。本文以中国有色矿业集团在赞比亚遭遇的劳资矛盾为例,从中国投资者、当地劳工和赞比亚主要政党之间博弈关系的角度,分析了频繁发生的劳资冲突背后的多重原因。频发的劳资冲突既与中资企业的用工实践和管理方式有关,也与赞比亚矿工的劳动观念和抗争传统有关。不过,中国资本与当地劳工之间的关系又受到赞比亚政党政治的影响。为了获得底层民众的政治支持,赞比亚的反对党把劳资议题引入总统选举竞争,激发了矿区劳工对中国资本的抗争。因此,中资企业在赞比亚的可持续发展,一方面要注重维护当地劳工权益和承担社会责任,另一方面要学会在民主选举的政治格局中寻求对自身权益的保护。

,AbstractEN:

The capital-labor conflict is one of major risks to be faced with by Chinese firms that develop overseas. Taking CNMC’S experience in Zambia as an example,this paper analyzed the multiple reasons that led to the frequent occurrence of capital-labor conflict from the perspective of game relationships among Chinese investor,local labor and Zambia’s major parties. The frequent occurrence of capital-labor conflict not only has to do with employment practice and management styles taken by Chinese company,but also with work moral and protest tradition held by Zambia miners. However,party politics in Zambia is another important factor that affects the relationship between Chinese investor and local miners. In order to get the vote support from miners,the opposition party brought the topic about industrial relations into Presidential election competition,which stimulated the protests against Chinese capital from the local miners. Therefore,Chinese overseas investors not only pay attention to undertake social responsibilities in host countries,but also learn to safeguard their own rights and interests in the democracy of party competition.

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李国武,中央财经大学社会发展学院社会学系教授。

"},"陈姝妤":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"电子邮箱:chenshuyu922@126.com。","Role":null,"Photo":null,"Blurb":"

陈姝妤,中央财经大学社会发展学院社会学系硕士研究生。

"},"LI Guo-wu":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"","Role":null,"Photo":"","Blurb":""},"CHEN Shu-yu":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"","Role":null,"Photo":"","Blurb":""}},BookPublishDate:2016-05-01 00:00:00.0,SearchTitle:东道国政党政治下的劳资博弈:以中色集团在赞比亚的遭遇为例,ISBN:978-7-5097-9047-2,BookTitle:经济社会学研究 第三辑,BookStatus:7,AllowDownload:Y,BookVersionNum:null,researchorg:null,CopyRightDate:null,ExcellentPeriod:null,PrizeLevel:null,IsExcellence:null,ContentClass:null,IsDisabled:N,SearchTitle_2:东道国政党政治下的劳资博弈:以中色集团在赞比亚的遭遇为例,_RowNo:2
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科斯(1994)曾设想(事实上他也做到了)将他的论文集的中译本命名为《论生产的制度结构》,并认为他“运用于分析西方的制度结构的方法,很可能在分析中国的制度时也同样有用,因为它将经济安排的基本方面具体化了”(科斯,序言,第1页)。这种方法,简而言之就是强调由于交易费用的存在,个人、组织或地区的专业分工会受到限制;相关的统制经济的制度结构“只能在比其他类似的统制经济或比市场运行的结果更有效率时才能生存下去”(科斯,序言,第2页)。这样的制度结构的分析方法当然也适用于分析国际生产“利得”的问题。当然,在面对国际问题时,现实取向的博弈论相较于笼统的交易费用论在细节方面能够给我们带来更多的启迪。只是在大的框架方面,考虑到交易费用的制度结构的分析方法仍然是有益的。

设想国际生产是一个组织过程,其细节自然涉及国际资本与东道国本土力量之间的谈判或曰博弈问题,其框架则适用于制度结构的分析。李国武、陈姝妤的论文《东道国政党政治下的劳资博弈:以中色集团在赞比亚的遭遇为例》(以下简称《劳资博弈》)至少能够在这两个方面给我们带来启迪。

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王水雄,中国人民大学社会学理论与方法研究中心副教授。

"},"Wang Shui-xiong":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"","Role":null,"Photo":"","Blurb":""}},BookPublishDate:2016-05-01 00:00:00.0,SearchTitle:降低国际生产“利得”的协调成本——对李国武、陈姝妤论文的评论,ISBN:978-7-5097-9047-2,BookTitle:经济社会学研究 第三辑,BookStatus:7,AllowDownload:Y,BookVersionNum:null,researchorg:null,CopyRightDate:null,ExcellentPeriod:null,PrizeLevel:null,IsExcellence:null,ContentClass:null,IsDisabled:N,SearchTitle_2:降低国际生产“利得”的协调成本——对李国武、陈姝妤论文的评论,_RowNo:3
CommonID:DIR_17143345,ID:7143345,SiteID:14,Type:chapter,Code:null,ParentId:0,InnerCode:196795,name:政企关系、双向寻租与中国的外资奇迹11470721,ShortName:,SubName:,EnTitle:Government-business Relations,Two-Way Rent Seeking and the FDI Miracle in China,EnShortTitle:,EnSubTitle:,Level:0,BookId:7143306,AbstractCH:

中国究竟如何创造出外资奇迹?根据笔者调查,中国吸收的制造业外资中,相当比例是受各地政府的优惠政策吸引。但地方政府为何如此热衷招商?关键在政府与外资间的“双向寻租”活动。这种活动既有传统寻租的企业逢迎政府,也有政府逢迎企业的“反向寻租”活动。笔者认为,正是这样的反向寻租,一方面遏制了寻租活动的过分猖獗,另一方面诱使地方政府提供大量优惠,换取外资企业的投资落地。中国的外资奇迹就这样被制造出来了。本文聚焦在“招商引资”过程中的政企互动,说明地方政府与外资企业的激励机制、行为及其后果。通过上述分析,笔者希望对中国如何参与国际生产提供一个制度层面的解释。

,AbstractEN:

How does China create a FDI miracle?Based on the field research,the authors find that a large amount of FDI was actually attracted by the preferential policies from local governments. But why are local governments so eager to propose these great deals?According to the authors,this has to do with the rent seeking that runs in both ways between local governments and foreign enterprises. It is especially the reversed rent-seeking,in which the local governments seek rents from enterprises,that contributes most to attract FDI flow to China,for it not only checks the rampancy of rent seeking,but also pushes the governments to offer the preferential policies. This is how the FDI miracle is created. The paper then goes on to illustrate the incentives,bargaining processes and the aftermaths of the government-business interactions over the FDI. In this sense,the paper proposes a micro-level institutional analysis of how China blends in the world economy.

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耿曙,上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院常任轨副教授。

"},"陈玮":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"电子邮箱:mcdull_chenwei@163.com","Role":null,"Photo":null,"Blurb":"

陈玮,上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院博士。

"},"Keng Shu":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"","Role":null,"Photo":"","Blurb":""},"Chen Wei":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"","Role":null,"Photo":"","Blurb":""}},BookPublishDate:2016-05-01 00:00:00.0,SearchTitle:政企关系、双向寻租与中国的外资奇迹,ISBN:978-7-5097-9047-2,BookTitle:经济社会学研究 第三辑,BookStatus:7,AllowDownload:Y,BookVersionNum:null,researchorg:null,CopyRightDate:null,ExcellentPeriod:null,PrizeLevel:null,IsExcellence:null,ContentClass:null,IsDisabled:N,SearchTitle_2:政企关系、双向寻租与中国的外资奇迹,_RowNo:4
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像其他发展中国家一样,中国经济发展也显著地依赖于吸引外资进入中国投资。那么,为何中国可以吸引到大量外资落地?耿曙与陈玮认为,答案系于政企之间所结成的“双向寻租”这一结构。这一概念认为,政府和企业都可能成为设租方和寻租方。既存在企业逢迎政府的传统寻租形式,也存在政府逢迎企业的“反向寻租”。反向寻租既遏制了传统寻租的猖獗,也诱使政府提供补贴或各种优惠,换取外资落地的好处。而这一概念中,重点自然是“双向寻租”这一新面向。

那么,为何形成这种结构?因为中国经济的央地分权结构,加上政府的晋升考核体制,促使地方政府追求经济成长,并陷入彼此竞赛。落实到具体的“招商引资”过程中,由于政府依赖企业来提升政绩显示度,使得那些能够带给地方政府垄断优势和超额利润的企业有了更高的谈判权力,地方政府反而需要借助各种补贴、优惠与优待来吸引这些外资企业。不仅如此,双向寻租还具有自我强化的效应,引诱更多政府和企业更深地卷入。“双向寻租”本身是一个用以刻画微观层面上政商关系互动的概念,它的制度基础则系于当下中国政府的特殊结构与运转机制,而它又令人信服地解释了中国地方政府成功吸引外资的原因。从而,作者们实现了一个从宏观制度到微观行动又回到宏观制度的解释链条。

耿曙与陈玮以政府与外资企业的互动关系作为切入点,提出一个新概念,以弥补市场视角和政府视角在解释中国外资增长奇迹时的不足或盲区。因此,本文正是希望在政商关系的视野中,试图对“双向寻租”这一概念的意义和限度做一点点理解。

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纪莺莺,南京大学社会学院助理研究员。

"},"Ji Ying-ying":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"","Role":null,"Photo":"","Blurb":""}},BookPublishDate:2016-05-01 00:00:00.0,SearchTitle:“双向寻租”与当代中国政商关系的转变——对耿曙和陈玮论文的评论,ISBN:978-7-5097-9047-2,BookTitle:经济社会学研究 第三辑,BookStatus:7,AllowDownload:Y,BookVersionNum:null,researchorg:null,CopyRightDate:null,ExcellentPeriod:null,PrizeLevel:null,IsExcellence:null,ContentClass:null,IsDisabled:N,SearchTitle_2:“双向寻租”与当代中国政商关系的转变——对耿曙和陈玮论文的评论,_RowNo:5
CommonID:DIR_17143382,ID:7143382,SiteID:14,Type:chapter,Code:null,ParentId:0,InnerCode:196797,name:政府内部上下级部门间谈判的一个分析模型,ShortName:,SubName:,EnTitle:Bureaucratic Bargaining in the Chinese Government,EnShortTitle:,EnSubTitle:,Level:0,BookId:7143306,AbstractCH:

政府内部上下级部门间“讨价还价”的谈判是政府运作过程的重要组成部分,也是认识政府组织制度和行为的一个切入点。本文提出关于中国政府内部上下级部门间谈判博弈的一个分析模型,讨论、阐述谈判博弈过程的制度规则、不同类型的策略选择以及这些要素之间的关联。本文的实质性分析得益于组织学的有关文献和我们对政府内部运作过程的田野观察。我们首先以谈判博弈模型作为分析视角,提出相关的研究问题和分析概念,建构科层制内部上下级部门间的诸类谈判模型,澄清各种谈判环节的逻辑关系,并讨论不同谈判博弈的启动条件。此后,我们通过某市环保局和其直接监督机构省环保厅之间互动的个案研究来阐述分析框架、理论思路和有待研究的问题。

,AbstractEN:

Bargaining between supervising and subordinate agencies is a ubiquitous phenomenon in governmental processes,taking place in specific organizational context and structured by the rules of the game. Hence,bureaucratic bargaining provides a port of entry from which to observe government institutions and behaviors. In the proposed sequential game of bargaining between a principal(e.g. a provincial environmental protection agency)and an agent(e.g. a municipal environmental agency),we identify two strategies——“routine” vs. “mobilizational” mode——available to the principal. The agent can choose from three response strategies in its subsequent move:“formal bargaining”,“informal bargaining” or “quasi-exit”. When the mobilizational mode is adopted by the principal,quasi-exit is the best choice for the agent;if the routine mode is present,the agent has more flexibility in choosing among the three alternatives.

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周雪光,斯坦福大学社会学系教授。

"},"练宏":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"电子邮箱:lianhong1218@163.com","Role":null,"Photo":null,"Blurb":"

练宏,中山大学政治与公共事务管理学院讲师。

"},"Zhou Xue-guang":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"","Role":null,"Photo":"","Blurb":""},"Lian Hong":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"","Role":null,"Photo":"","Blurb":""}},BookPublishDate:2016-05-01 00:00:00.0,SearchTitle:政府内部上下级部门间谈判的一个分析模型——以环境政策实施领域为例,ISBN:978-7-5097-9047-2,BookTitle:经济社会学研究 第三辑,BookStatus:7,AllowDownload:Y,BookVersionNum:null,researchorg:null,CopyRightDate:null,ExcellentPeriod:null,PrizeLevel:null,IsExcellence:null,ContentClass:null,IsDisabled:N,SearchTitle_2:政府内部上下级部门间谈判的一个分析模型——以环境政策实施领域为例,_RowNo:6
CommonID:DIR_17143435,ID:7143435,SiteID:14,Type:chapter,Code:null,ParentId:0,InnerCode:196798,name:评论 关于政府内部上下级谈判研究的几点想法,ShortName:,SubName:,EnTitle:Review,EnShortTitle:,EnSubTitle:,Level:0,BookId:7143306,AbstractCH:

周雪光与练宏的论文《政府内部上下级部门间谈判的一个分析模型》(以下简称《谈判》)在研究中国政府科层体系内部的谈判方面可以说是一篇奠基之作,而这又得益于博弈论的运用。本文将从博弈论的研究路径与具体的谈判研究方面,略谈一些想法。

,AbstractEN:,KeyWords:443927,443928,3750,2786,EKeyWords:443929,443930,24945,2787,SubjectWords:,LiteratureId:7143436,Fileref:null,OrderFlag:0,IsLeaf:N,PubDate:null,FindDate:null,IssueDate:null,DocType:null,ProductSeries:null,Doi:null,InstanceID:0,MinNodeSearch:Y,XmlID:b1201601010010614_000_006,Prop1:null,Prop2:null,Prop3:null,prop4:null,AddUser:admin,AddTime:2016-06-14 15:00:52.0,ModifyUser:Admin,ModifyTime:2023-11-06 13:39:15.0,HitCount:23,ShowType:putong,LogoID:0,PdfID:7143437,DownCount:19,AuthorInfos:{"刘世定":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"电子邮箱:liushd@pku.edu.cn","Role":null,"Photo":null,"Blurb":"

刘世定,北京大学社会学系教授。

"},"Liu Shi-ding":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"","Role":null,"Photo":"","Blurb":""}},BookPublishDate:2016-05-01 00:00:00.0,SearchTitle:关于政府内部上下级谈判研究的几点想法,ISBN:978-7-5097-9047-2,BookTitle:经济社会学研究 第三辑,BookStatus:7,AllowDownload:Y,BookVersionNum:null,researchorg:null,CopyRightDate:null,ExcellentPeriod:null,PrizeLevel:null,IsExcellence:null,ContentClass:null,IsDisabled:N,SearchTitle_2:关于政府内部上下级谈判研究的几点想法,_RowNo:7
CommonID:DIR_17143452,ID:7143452,SiteID:14,Type:chapter,Code:null,ParentId:0,InnerCode:196799,name:信息隐藏与治理的组织经济学分析,ShortName:,SubName:,EnTitle:An Analytical Framework of Organizational Economics on Information Concealment and Governance,EnShortTitle:,EnSubTitle:,Level:0,BookId:7143306,AbstractCH:

本文从一个航空公司的安全管理经验提取基础性元素,为信息隐藏的研究提供了一个统一的分析框架。本文研究的核心主题是治理结构如何影响到信息隐藏行为的发生与防范,以及信息隐藏行为如何影响到治理结构的运作。本文首先在委托者-监督者-代理者三层委托代理模型下,探讨了监督者与代理者的共谋与信息隐藏行为;此后在委托者-多代理者的委托代理模型下,研究了三种类型信息搜寻模式;然后分析了信息结构与治理策略的不同组合如何影响到上下级部门之间的讨价还价谈判模式。

,AbstractEN:

This paper tries to build up an inherent analytical framework on information concealment based on the experiences of safety management of an airline company. The core research theme of this paper is the interaction mechanisms between governance structure and information concealment:on one hand how governance structure affects the occurrence of information concealment and its prevention,on the other hand how information structure reacts against the function of governance structure. Firstly,with the help of a principal-supervisor-agent model,this paper studies the mechanisms and logics of collusion between supervisor and agent in organization and their impacts on the occurrence of information concealment. Secondly,this paper develops a theoretical framework to illustrate the different efficiencies of three types of information searching based on a model of principal and multi-agents. Finally,this paper discusses how different combinations of information governance and governance strategies affect the modes of bargain in organization.

,KeyWords:333266,58188,330542,333267,333268,333269,EKeyWords:333270,67023,39067,333271,333272,333273,SubjectWords:,LiteratureId:7143453,Fileref:null,OrderFlag:0,IsLeaf:N,PubDate:null,FindDate:null,IssueDate:null,DocType:null,ProductSeries:null,Doi:null,InstanceID:0,MinNodeSearch:Y,XmlID:b1201601010010614_000_007,Prop1:null,Prop2:null,Prop3:null,prop4:null,AddUser:admin,AddTime:2016-06-14 15:00:52.0,ModifyUser:Admin,ModifyTime:2023-11-06 13:39:15.0,HitCount:19,ShowType:putong,LogoID:0,PdfID:7143454,DownCount:16,AuthorInfos:{"刘万顺":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"电子邮箱:liuwanshunpku@gmail.com","Role":null,"Photo":null,"Blurb":"

刘万顺,北京大学社会学系硕士研究生,现任职于华鲁国际融资租赁有限公司投资银行部。

"},"Liu Wan-shun":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"","Role":null,"Photo":"","Blurb":""}},BookPublishDate:2016-05-01 00:00:00.0,SearchTitle:信息隐藏与治理的组织经济学分析——来自某航空公司的案例,ISBN:978-7-5097-9047-2,BookTitle:经济社会学研究 第三辑,BookStatus:7,AllowDownload:Y,BookVersionNum:null,researchorg:null,CopyRightDate:null,ExcellentPeriod:null,PrizeLevel:null,IsExcellence:null,ContentClass:null,IsDisabled:N,SearchTitle_2:信息隐藏与治理的组织经济学分析——来自某航空公司的案例,_RowNo:8
CommonID:DIR_17143598,ID:7143598,SiteID:14,Type:chapter,Code:null,ParentId:0,InnerCode:196800,name:评论 信息隐瞒与治理结构,ShortName:,SubName:,EnTitle:Review,EnShortTitle:,EnSubTitle:,Level:0,BookId:7143306,AbstractCH:

刘万顺的这篇长文基于对一家大型航空公司内部安全管理中存在的信息隐藏现象的案例调研,通过案例材料与理论模型逻辑推导之间的互动,“尝试在主流组织理论的脉络下为信息隐藏行为的研究提供一个统一的分析框架”,“厘清信息隐藏这一制度现象的存在机理与行为逻辑”。

具体而言,作者主要做了三个方面的工作:一是“在委托者-监督者-代理者三层模型下研究信息隐藏的机制”;二是“在委托者-多代理者模型下研究信息搜寻及其与治理结构的关系”;三是分析“信息结构反过来如何影响到治理结构,特别是上下级部门之间的讨价还价谈判”。全文理论命题清晰,分析层次井然有序,得到逻辑推理的政策含义也是富有启发的。

下面我主要谈阅读本文时想到的几个问题。

第一,根据作者的委托者-监督者-代理者三层模型,委托人不应该要求监督者为如实报送代理者的不安全事件信息而承担连带责任,但为什么本案例中恰好相反?

,AbstractEN:,KeyWords:443935,58188,443907,EKeyWords:443936,67023,443912,SubjectWords:,LiteratureId:7143599,Fileref:null,OrderFlag:0,IsLeaf:Y,PubDate:null,FindDate:null,IssueDate:null,DocType:null,ProductSeries:null,Doi:null,InstanceID:0,MinNodeSearch:Y,XmlID:b1201601010010614_000_008,Prop1:null,Prop2:null,Prop3:null,prop4:null,AddUser:admin,AddTime:2016-06-14 15:00:54.0,ModifyUser:Admin,ModifyTime:2023-11-06 13:39:15.0,HitCount:19,ShowType:putong,LogoID:0,PdfID:7143600,DownCount:15,AuthorInfos:{"张翔":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"电子邮箱:xiangzhang@zju.edu.cn","Role":null,"Photo":null,"Blurb":"

张翔,浙江大学公共管理学院副教授。

"},"Zhang Xiang":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"","Role":null,"Photo":"","Blurb":""}},BookPublishDate:2016-05-01 00:00:00.0,SearchTitle:信息隐瞒与治理结构——对刘万顺论文的几点评论,ISBN:978-7-5097-9047-2,BookTitle:经济社会学研究 第三辑,BookStatus:7,AllowDownload:Y,BookVersionNum:null,researchorg:null,CopyRightDate:null,ExcellentPeriod:null,PrizeLevel:null,IsExcellence:null,ContentClass:null,IsDisabled:N,SearchTitle_2:信息隐瞒与治理结构——对刘万顺论文的几点评论,_RowNo:9
CommonID:DIR_17143601,ID:7143601,SiteID:14,Type:chapter,Code:null,ParentId:0,InnerCode:196801,name:公共选择过程中的公平:逻辑与运作,ShortName:,SubName:,EnTitle:Fairness in the Process of Public Choice,EnShortTitle:,EnSubTitle:,Level:0,BookId:7143306,AbstractCH:

本文通过对20世纪90年代中期中国华北地区一个村落中土地调整过程的考察,分析了村民在“有限不确定性”条件下的利益互动和公平规范互动交织的过程。本文具体揭示出,当事者据以互动的公平规范存在差异,并有不同的逻辑;在非正式场合和正式场合,公平表达存在差异,其策略性程度也有所不同;正式场合的公平规范互动,促成某种规范排序;在公共选择的方案酝酿、方案决策、方案实施诸环节中,当事者公平理念的具体含义既有不同又存在联系,并且一个环节遗留的张力会向下一环节转移;现实的公共选择,是在利益互动和公平规范的互动中做出的。

,AbstractEN:

This paper analysis the process of interaction of interests and interaction of fairness rules under the veil of limited uncertainty in a case study on reallocating land in a village in North China in the middle of 1990s. This paper finds that villagers interact with different fairness rules and logics. Their expressions on fairness are different between informal and formal situation. The fairness rule interactions in the formal situation promote the order of social rules. In the stages of planning,decision-making and implement in the public choice of land reallocating,the villagers’ ideas on fairness both differ and link with each other. The tension in the early stage will be transferred to the latter stage. The public choice in the real world is made in the process of interaction of interests and interaction of fairness rules.

,KeyWords:333274,306230,333275,333276,EKeyWords:333277,306231,333279,333280,SubjectWords:,LiteratureId:7143602,Fileref:null,OrderFlag:0,IsLeaf:N,PubDate:null,FindDate:null,IssueDate:null,DocType:null,ProductSeries:null,Doi:null,InstanceID:0,MinNodeSearch:Y,XmlID:b1201601010010614_000_009,Prop1:null,Prop2:null,Prop3:null,prop4:null,AddUser:admin,AddTime:2016-06-14 15:00:54.0,ModifyUser:Admin,ModifyTime:2023-11-06 13:39:15.0,HitCount:13,ShowType:putong,LogoID:0,PdfID:7143603,DownCount:17,AuthorInfos:{"刘世定":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"电子邮箱:liushd@pku.edu.cn","Role":null,"Photo":null,"Blurb":"

刘世定,北京大学社会学系教授。

"},"Liu Shi-ding":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"","Role":null,"Photo":"","Blurb":""}},BookPublishDate:2016-05-01 00:00:00.0,SearchTitle:公共选择过程中的公平:逻辑与运作——中国农村土地调整的一个案例,ISBN:978-7-5097-9047-2,BookTitle:经济社会学研究 第三辑,BookStatus:7,AllowDownload:Y,BookVersionNum:null,researchorg:null,CopyRightDate:null,ExcellentPeriod:null,PrizeLevel:null,IsExcellence:null,ContentClass:null,IsDisabled:N,SearchTitle_2:公共选择过程中的公平:逻辑与运作——中国农村土地调整的一个案例,_RowNo:10
CommonID:DIR_17143634,ID:7143634,SiteID:14,Type:chapter,Code:null,ParentId:0,InnerCode:196802,name:评论 走向互动过程的规范:集体选择、博弈与演化,ShortName:,SubName:,EnTitle:Review,EnShortTitle:,EnSubTitle:,Level:0,BookId:7143306,AbstractCH:

布坎南教授所开创的公共选择研究基于个体主义的前提,使用经济学的交易范式来理解政治学中的公共选择问题。这一研究策略力图在分析集体选择问题时,摆脱实然与应然之间的缠绕,从而更多地关注个体在公共选择中的理性决策过程及其结果。基于此,这一研究框架将更为警惕地对待将集体视为由共识性道德伦理所维系的有机体这一观点。然而,当事者在公共选择过程中所秉持的道德观念及对具体策略的价值判断始终是分析过程中必须要面对的。布坎南讨论了在“不确定性帷幕”下的公平问题,认为当规则确定后其最终的位置结果存在高度不确定性的时候,人们就会倾向于选择一种公平的规则。

,AbstractEN:,KeyWords:443945,157014,443907,EKeyWords:443946,157016,443948,SubjectWords:,LiteratureId:7143635,Fileref:null,OrderFlag:0,IsLeaf:Y,PubDate:null,FindDate:null,IssueDate:null,DocType:null,ProductSeries:null,Doi:null,InstanceID:0,MinNodeSearch:Y,XmlID:b1201601010010614_000_010,Prop1:null,Prop2:null,Prop3:null,prop4:null,AddUser:admin,AddTime:2016-06-14 15:00:55.0,ModifyUser:Admin,ModifyTime:2023-11-06 13:39:15.0,HitCount:15,ShowType:putong,LogoID:0,PdfID:7143636,DownCount:21,AuthorInfos:{"翟宇航":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"电子邮箱:yhangzhai@126.com","Role":null,"Photo":null,"Blurb":"

翟宇航,北京大学社会学系硕士毕业,目前在华夏基金管理公司工作。

"},"Zhai Yuhang":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"","Role":null,"Photo":"","Blurb":""}},BookPublishDate:2016-05-01 00:00:00.0,SearchTitle:走向互动过程的规范:集体选择、博弈与演化——对刘世定论文的评论,ISBN:978-7-5097-9047-2,BookTitle:经济社会学研究 第三辑,BookStatus:7,AllowDownload:Y,BookVersionNum:null,researchorg:null,CopyRightDate:null,ExcellentPeriod:null,PrizeLevel:null,IsExcellence:null,ContentClass:null,IsDisabled:N,SearchTitle_2:走向互动过程的规范:集体选择、博弈与演化——对刘世定论文的评论,_RowNo:11
CommonID:DIR_17143637,ID:7143637,SiteID:14,Type:chapter,Code:null,ParentId:0,InnerCode:196803,name:认同、情境定义与博弈路径,ShortName:,SubName:,EnTitle:Identity,Definition of Situation and Modeling Approaches in the Game,EnShortTitle:,EnSubTitle:,Level:0,BookId:7143306,AbstractCH:

长期以来,经典博弈理论需对每个博弈做出一系列限定,以使博弈达到相应的均衡,这些限定构成了博弈理论的隐含假设。然而,现实中的博弈并非封闭在一个给定的环境中,博弈者随时受到外界情境影响,需要在做出行动策略前赋予所处情境和其他行动者一定意义。本文在梳理经典博弈论建模思路的基础上,指出了经典博弈模型的隐含假设和可能存在的“盲点”;同时尝试将社会学中的“情境定义”和“认同”等概念引入博弈论进行探讨。本文认为,情境定义既可能影响互动的基本环境,也可能影响对互动对方的辨认和认同;博弈者在不同情境定义下,其行为逻辑和策略选择将大相径庭,博弈的发展路径也因此产生很大差异。

,AbstractEN:

For a long period of time,game theory has traditionally relied upon a tacit and “classical” set of modeling paradigms. In order to reach equilibrium,classical game theorists need to set some limits for every model,which make the implied assumptions of game theory. However,games that happen in the real world are not confined to a given circumstance. Game players are often influenced by the outside situation. And people need to define the situation and identify other actors before they develop strategies. It leaves open of the question that what will happen to the game models if we take into consideration the factors like definition of situation and identity?Definition of situation can influence both the basic environment of interaction and identification of other actors. Defining situation in a different way,game players take different logic of behavior and strategies,which will make a huge difference in approach-developing in the game. This paper reviews the logic and modeling paradigms of classical game theory and points out their implied assumptions and possible ‘blind spots’. It also reviews key conceptions like definition of situation and identity in the theory of social interactionism and discuss the possibility of introducing them into game theory.

,KeyWords:41888,333281,333282,EKeyWords:40502,333283,333284,SubjectWords:,LiteratureId:7143638,Fileref:null,OrderFlag:0,IsLeaf:N,PubDate:null,FindDate:null,IssueDate:null,DocType:null,ProductSeries:null,Doi:null,InstanceID:0,MinNodeSearch:Y,XmlID:b1201601010010614_000_011,Prop1:null,Prop2:null,Prop3:null,prop4:null,AddUser:admin,AddTime:2016-06-14 15:00:55.0,ModifyUser:Admin,ModifyTime:2023-11-06 13:39:15.0,HitCount:27,ShowType:putong,LogoID:0,PdfID:7143639,DownCount:17,AuthorInfos:{"胡倩影":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"电子邮箱:qianying.hu@gmail.com","Role":null,"Photo":null,"Blurb":"

胡倩影,北京大学社会学系2007级硕士,现任职于岩星投资基金。

"},"Hu Qian-ying":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"","Role":null,"Photo":"","Blurb":""}},BookPublishDate:2016-05-01 00:00:00.0,SearchTitle:认同、情境定义与博弈路径,ISBN:978-7-5097-9047-2,BookTitle:经济社会学研究 第三辑,BookStatus:7,AllowDownload:Y,BookVersionNum:null,researchorg:null,CopyRightDate:null,ExcellentPeriod:null,PrizeLevel:null,IsExcellence:null,ContentClass:null,IsDisabled:N,SearchTitle_2:认同、情境定义与博弈路径,_RowNo:12
CommonID:DIR_17143708,ID:7143708,SiteID:14,Type:chapter,Code:null,ParentId:0,InnerCode:196804,name:评论 着眼于认同和情境定义在博弈中的规律,ShortName:,SubName:,EnTitle:Review,EnShortTitle:,EnSubTitle:,Level:0,BookId:7143306,AbstractCH:

胡倩影的论文比较细致地在博弈论中引入了社会学中耳熟能详的认同和情境定义问题,试图将博弈论放置在更为真实的现实基础之上,增强博弈论的社会分析能力。这是在博弈论社会学化的发展方向上的一次有益尝试,这一尝试有利于社会分析理论空间的开拓。不过,也需要注意,把握住这样的博弈论为社会分析所能提供的参考性方向仍然是相当重要的——并不是任意的两种理论的结合都能产生好的“新结果”。

,AbstractEN:,KeyWords:41888,333281,443954,443955,EKeyWords:40502,443957,443958,443961,SubjectWords:,LiteratureId:7143709,Fileref:null,OrderFlag:0,IsLeaf:N,PubDate:null,FindDate:null,IssueDate:null,DocType:null,ProductSeries:null,Doi:null,InstanceID:0,MinNodeSearch:Y,XmlID:b1201601010010614_000_012,Prop1:null,Prop2:null,Prop3:null,prop4:null,AddUser:admin,AddTime:2016-06-14 15:00:56.0,ModifyUser:Admin,ModifyTime:2023-11-06 13:39:15.0,HitCount:13,ShowType:putong,LogoID:0,PdfID:7143710,DownCount:15,AuthorInfos:{"王水雄":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"电子邮箱:xiongshui@ruc.edu.cn","Role":null,"Photo":null,"Blurb":"

王水雄,中国人民大学社会学理论与方法研究中心副教授。

"},"Wang Shui-xiong":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"","Role":null,"Photo":"","Blurb":""}},BookPublishDate:2016-05-01 00:00:00.0,SearchTitle:着眼于认同和情境定义在博弈中的规律——对胡倩影论文的评议,ISBN:978-7-5097-9047-2,BookTitle:经济社会学研究 第三辑,BookStatus:7,AllowDownload:Y,BookVersionNum:null,researchorg:null,CopyRightDate:null,ExcellentPeriod:null,PrizeLevel:null,IsExcellence:null,ContentClass:null,IsDisabled:N,SearchTitle_2:着眼于认同和情境定义在博弈中的规律——对胡倩影论文的评议,_RowNo:13
CommonID:DIR_17143715,ID:7143715,SiteID:14,Type:chapter,Code:null,ParentId:0,InnerCode:196805,name:“孙子兵法”VS.“谢林战略”,ShortName:,SubName:,EnTitle:“Military Science of Sun Zi” VS. “Thomas Schelling’s Strategy”,EnShortTitle:,EnSubTitle:,Level:0,BookId:7143306,AbstractCH:

长期以来较少被纳入社会学思考视野的《孙子兵法》以及《冲突战略学》有着共同的博弈论取向。它们不仅贴近于真实世界,而且总结了一些对战争、组织和博弈结果具有解释力的规律。基于对任责、任势和结构运作这三个核心概念,其所在的理论体系以及它们的前提比较分析和融会贯通,不难发现,由此得出的“社会博弈论”有助于理解不同时期的社会格局和解释大量的社会现象。这一博弈论有着相当可观的发展空间。其“模型加案例”的研究方法对研究现在和推测未来有着广阔的应用前景,在一定程度上亦可被用来整理中国的传统文化。

,AbstractEN:

“Military Science of Sun Zi” and The Strategy of Conflict which have long been neglected by thoughts of Sociology have some similar characteristics on their approaches of game theory. They not only both correspond with the real world,but also collect some principles manageable and interpretative for wars,organizations and game results. The approach has been inherited and enhanced by Gaming with Social Structures. “Social Game Theory” which obtained through the comparative analysis and integration of commitment,Ren-shi and operation of structures,and the theoretical systems they belong to,and their assumptions,would be helpful for us to make clear the social situations of different ages,and to explain many social phenomena. This kind of game theory has a considerable development space. Its “models + cases” methodology can be widely applied in today’s research and getting deductions for the future,as well as to reorganize the abundant Chinese traditional culture.

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王水雄,中国人民大学社会学理论与方法研究中心副教授。

"},"Wang Shui-xiong":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"","Role":null,"Photo":"","Blurb":""}},BookPublishDate:2016-05-01 00:00:00.0,SearchTitle:“孙子兵法”VS.“谢林战略”——社会博弈论的古今传承与中西融合,ISBN:978-7-5097-9047-2,BookTitle:经济社会学研究 第三辑,BookStatus:7,AllowDownload:Y,BookVersionNum:null,researchorg:null,CopyRightDate:null,ExcellentPeriod:null,PrizeLevel:null,IsExcellence:null,ContentClass:null,IsDisabled:N,SearchTitle_2:“孙子兵法”VS.“谢林战略”——社会博弈论的古今传承与中西融合,_RowNo:14
CommonID:DIR_17143732,ID:7143732,SiteID:14,Type:chapter,Code:null,ParentId:0,InnerCode:196806,name:评论 社会博弈论:博弈论中的“帝王心术”,ShortName:,SubName:,EnTitle:Review,EnShortTitle:,EnSubTitle:,Level:0,BookId:7143306,AbstractCH:

王水雄副教授的《“孙子兵法”VS.“谢林战略”——社会博弈论的古今传承与中西融合》这篇文章,从经济社会学的观点出发,将《孙子兵法》中的“任势”思想、托马斯·谢林的“任责”思想以及自己在《结构博弈》中总结的“结构运作”理论进行了并列式比较,讨论了三者在以人与人(或组织与组织、组织与人)之间的相互作用(或者说“博弈”)为对象的研究中的相似性和差异性,并通过对三者的核心概念和理论前提的比较分析和融会贯通,揭示了一种颇有应用前景和发展潜力的博弈理论。这一理论,由于敏锐地把握了当代信息化的社会生活现实与核威慑背景下的国际博弈大前提,并将组织理论、时空标识等社会学因素引入博弈论中,也因此被作者称为“社会博弈论”,即“社会学版本的博弈论”。

既然提出了“社会博弈论”这一概念,就免不了将其与经典博弈论进行比较。作者在论述中,有意识地区分了二者关于博弈参与人的谈判地位及其行动自主性的理论预设的不同。作者认为,经典博弈论强调在博弈起始点上,参与者双方之间“地位的平等性”“行为选择的独立自主性”;而“社会博弈论”则未对此做出严格预设。笔者基本同意作者对二者进行前提辨识所得出的结论,不过,笔者认为,在“社会博弈论”,特别是其中的“任责”与“任势”的思路中,由于社会结构因素的引入,有一个呼之欲出——而作者没有着重突出——的重要概念,使得这一理论进路中的博弈关系与经典博弈论中的互动关系具有本质性的区别。这个概念,就是“权力”。

,AbstractEN:,KeyWords:333288,443973,443907,EKeyWords:333292,443976,443948,SubjectWords:,LiteratureId:7143733,Fileref:null,OrderFlag:0,IsLeaf:Y,PubDate:null,FindDate:null,IssueDate:null,DocType:null,ProductSeries:null,Doi:null,InstanceID:0,MinNodeSearch:Y,XmlID:b1201601010010614_000_014,Prop1:null,Prop2:null,Prop3:null,prop4:null,AddUser:admin,AddTime:2016-06-14 15:00:57.0,ModifyUser:Admin,ModifyTime:2023-11-06 13:39:15.0,HitCount:11,ShowType:putong,LogoID:0,PdfID:7143734,DownCount:16,AuthorInfos:{"林思成":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"电子邮箱:marklin1992@163.com","Role":null,"Photo":null,"Blurb":"

林思成,中国人民大学社会学系研究生。

"},"Lin Si-cheng":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"","Role":null,"Photo":"","Blurb":""}},BookPublishDate:2016-05-01 00:00:00.0,SearchTitle:社会博弈论:博弈论中的“帝王心术”——对王水雄论文的评论,ISBN:978-7-5097-9047-2,BookTitle:经济社会学研究 第三辑,BookStatus:7,AllowDownload:Y,BookVersionNum:null,researchorg:null,CopyRightDate:null,ExcellentPeriod:null,PrizeLevel:null,IsExcellence:null,ContentClass:null,IsDisabled:N,SearchTitle_2:社会博弈论:博弈论中的“帝王心术”——对王水雄论文的评论,_RowNo:15
CommonID:DIR_17143735,ID:7143735,SiteID:14,Type:chapter,Code:null,ParentId:0,InnerCode:196807,name:社会倾斜系统中的信息和个体行为11470787,ShortName:,SubName:,EnTitle:Social Tipping System:Literature Analysis in The View of Economic Sociology Daniel,EnShortTitle:,EnSubTitle:,Level:0,BookId:7143306,AbstractCH:

笔者(郭爱民,2015)对社会倾斜系统的数学描述和临界值模型做了文献梳理,因限于篇幅,未对关键信息的作用进行讨论。本文在此基础上,对信息在社会倾斜系统中的作用做了分析。研究表明,信息也对社会倾斜系统的形成有重要影响,在个体决策过程中,关键信息通过改变个人的预期影响行动者的行为,从而改变系统的运动过程。个体在互动过程中,信息不对称将导致系统朝消失的方向倾斜。当信息失效时,就形成了信息流这样的社会倾斜系统,信息流具有脆弱性。这为进一步研究提供了理论参考,也可以为相关部门制定治理问题的政策提供理论依据。

,AbstractEN:

There is an array of instabilities phenomenon our society which referred by Economics Nobel Winner Thomas Schelling as “Tipping systems” that take on diffusion or vibration in system level. In macroscopic,they are instable,while in microscopic they are the equilibrium of individual rational choice. Therefore,they are referred as “instable equilibrium” in this paper,and instable equilibrium analysis refers to study of formation and mechanisms of tipping system based on individual rational choice.

Literature review of tipping systems shows there are two approaches,namely systematic approach and individual approach. In systematic approach,descriptions of tipping systems reveal that if an agent could only change his status in one direction,the tipping system will tip uni-directionally,which leads to either collapse or rebound to original status;if the agent has binary choices,the tipping system will also tip bi-directionally,that is,vibration. We may find multiple statuses in some tipping systems,and they may tip to diffusion,or back to equilibrium(stability status). Tipping systems with different mode of movement can be described by different mathematic models. Individual approach concerns the formation and movement mechanisms of tipping systems,and mathematic instrument varies by perspective. Mathematic programming can be applied to individual decision-making,and agent’s rational choice could be accounted by individual utility maximization;while game theory can be applied to interaction between agents,where dynamic processes of system movements could be derived of individual behaviors. If system has multiple possible statuses,transformation of the system statuses depends on critical mass. As a certain variable reaches its critical mass,the system will transfer from stability to tipping or from one tipping process to another one,and different tipping systems may have different critical masses. Information also plays an important role in formation of tipping systems. In individual decision-making,critical information may adjust his expectation,therefore influence his behavior and change the movement of the system accordingly. In interaction,information asymmetry will result in system tipping to dissolution. As information losses its efficacy,a specific fragile tipping system,namely Information Cascades,will be formed,and Information Cascades are fragile.

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郭爱民,北京大学社会学系2005级硕士研究生,现供职于广东省人民政府金融工作办公室。

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郭爱民论文的初稿完成于2008年,当时金融危机带来的影响逐渐蔓延到中国,并导致政府“四万亿”计划的出台。危机和恐慌成为公共话题的焦点,也自然而然成为我们读书会讨论的主题。一个很深的感受是,在连篇累牍的分析报道中,社会学家的声音显得很微弱,社会学惯用的冗长论述显然没有经济学家那些精巧的模型、大胆的预测和雄心勃勃的干预措施更吸引人。加强对数学工具的掌握及更频繁地使用数学工具能够帮助社会学者更清晰、更准确、更简洁地讨论问题,这正是爱民写作的初衷,他在一篇文章(郭爱民,2015)中提到希望“为社会学领域利用数学模型建构理论提供参考”。

数理模型具有精确简洁、逻辑严密的优点,但是往往要对现实经验进行高度抽象和简化,若不加以谨慎检讨便草率地用来指导政策实践,恐怕会事与愿违。此时引入社会学概念和视角,有助于对既有理论进行修正并促进理论进一步发展。在进行文献梳理时,爱民尤为注重比较不同理论模型在前提条件和假设方面的差异与关联,在这些地方往往能够挖掘出很多有潜力的经济学与社会学理论的结合点、对话点,这正是蕴含在文献分析背后的深意。遗憾的是,囿于篇幅,爱民在此并未展开更为充分的讨论。

,AbstractEN:,KeyWords:124258,443984,318883,443907,EKeyWords:124260,443985,443986,443948,SubjectWords:,LiteratureId:7143798,Fileref:null,OrderFlag:0,IsLeaf:Y,PubDate:null,FindDate:null,IssueDate:null,DocType:null,ProductSeries:null,Doi:null,InstanceID:0,MinNodeSearch:Y,XmlID:b1201601010010614_000_016,Prop1:null,Prop2:null,Prop3:null,prop4:null,AddUser:admin,AddTime:2016-06-14 15:00:59.0,ModifyUser:Admin,ModifyTime:2023-11-06 13:39:15.0,HitCount:4,ShowType:putong,LogoID:0,PdfID:7143799,DownCount:14,AuthorInfos:{"王维":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"电子邮箱:weiweipku@163.com","Role":null,"Photo":null,"Blurb":"

王维,中央社会主义学院讲师。

"},"Wang Wei":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"","Role":null,"Photo":"","Blurb":""}},BookPublishDate:2016-05-01 00:00:00.0,SearchTitle:经济社会学的理论关怀与现实关怀——对郭爱民论文的评论,ISBN:978-7-5097-9047-2,BookTitle:经济社会学研究 第三辑,BookStatus:7,AllowDownload:Y,BookVersionNum:null,researchorg:null,CopyRightDate:null,ExcellentPeriod:null,PrizeLevel:null,IsExcellence:null,ContentClass:null,IsDisabled:N,SearchTitle_2:经济社会学的理论关怀与现实关怀——对郭爱民论文的评论,_RowNo:17
CommonID:DIR_17143800,ID:7143800,SiteID:14,Type:chapter,Code:null,ParentId:0,InnerCode:196809,name:专业技术-金融资本主义与社会结构变迁,ShortName:,SubName:,EnTitle:Professional Technology-financial Capitalism and the Transition of Social Structure,EnShortTitle:,EnSubTitle:,Level:0,BookId:7143306,AbstractCH:

20世纪70年代以来,伴随着信息技术革命的扩散和推动,金融领域出现了金融技术革命,突出表现为金融工具的多样化、金融交易的复杂化以及承担金融创新职能的技术专家群体逐渐形成。这些变化与金融资产规模的迅速增长互相影响,使得当代金融市场和金融资本主义的发展态势出现了新的图景。伴随着这些发展变化,金融创新技术作为稀缺要素进入金融市场,与市场上相对充足的金融资产开始结合,掌握新金融技术的专家群体也因此获得了强大的市场地位,并开始影响社会群体关联和社会制度结构。技术作为资本形态和金融资本的结合已经在经验层面被体察到,而这种新的资本结合不仅拉大了财富维度上的社会分化,而且可能会带来一种新型资本主义形态,即专业技术-金融资本主义,这是值得关注的社会现象和发展趋势。

,AbstractEN:

Since the 1970s,with the rapid spread of information technology revolution,financial technology revolution has appeared in the global financial market. It stands out as the variety of technology instrument,the complexity of financial transaction and the forming of financial technology expert group which take the function of financial innovation. These changes interact with the rapid expansion of financial assets,and provide a new picture for the contemporary financial market and financial capitalism together. In the background of these developments,financial technology has entered the market as a kind of scarce resources,and has combined with comparatively sufficient financial assets. Hence,the expert group which masters new financial technology has gotten powerful market status,and has started to influence other social groups and the social system. Technology has been observed as the combination of financial form and financial asset in the experimental perspective. This new form of financial combination may not only exacerbate the imbalanced state ofglobal wealth distribution,but also promote the occurrence of professional technology-financial capitalism. We must pay high attention to this phenomenon.

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尹鹤灵,北京大学社会学博士,现供职于共青团北京市海淀区委员会。

"},"Yin He-ling":{"Address":"","Affiliation":"","Email":"","Role":null,"Photo":"","Blurb":""}},BookPublishDate:2016-05-01 00:00:00.0,SearchTitle:专业技术-金融资本主义与社会结构变迁,ISBN:978-7-5097-9047-2,BookTitle:经济社会学研究 第三辑,BookStatus:7,AllowDownload:Y,BookVersionNum:null,researchorg:null,CopyRightDate:null,ExcellentPeriod:null,PrizeLevel:null,IsExcellence:null,ContentClass:null,IsDisabled:N,SearchTitle_2:专业技术-金融资本主义与社会结构变迁,_RowNo:18
CommonID:DIR_17143815,ID:7143815,SiteID:14,Type:chapter,Code:null,ParentId:0,InnerCode:196810,name:评论 对尹鹤灵论文的评论,ShortName:,SubName:,EnTitle:Review,EnShortTitle:,EnSubTitle:,Level:0,BookId:7143306,AbstractCH:

尹鹤灵博士的论文《专业技术-金融资本主义与社会结构变迁》,敏锐地洞察了当代金融市场和社会结构的重要变化,即“专业技术-金融资本主义”的新型资本主义形态渐趋形成,对技术、金融与社会之间的关系进行了颇具创新性的理论探讨。作者以金融技术专家群体作为分析着力点,完成了从信息技术革命到新型资本主义形态的逻辑框架建构。细看文章的逻辑线索,不难发现三个核心的论述环节:第一,信息技术革命推动了金融领域的革命性演变,即金融工具的多样化、金融交易的复杂化和金融技术专家群体的出现;第二,金融技术专家群体的技术优势,极大影响着自身与投资者和金融监管者等主体的关系,形塑了社会群体关联和社会制度结构;第三,专业技术资本与金融资本的稳定结合,正在加剧形成新的社会分化,使得专业技术-金融资本主义这一新的社会形态逐渐浮出水面。

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向静林,社会学博士,中国社会科学院社会学研究所助理研究员。

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