The United States, as the last remaining superpower of the cold war, owns a global preponderance without any real challenge from other powers for the time being. To display its resolve to the global powers, to demonstrate sound commitment to its long-tested allies in shaping a new world order, and to cope with new emerging security issues, the U. S. has led lots of transnational activities. These activities include Operation Desert Storm in Iraq, peacekeeping operations or intervention diplomacy in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the military strike on Yugoslavia while maintaining its large forces in Europe and East Asia.

Even if the US enjoys the fruits of the post-cold war and the exalted status with no competing adversary, there are many strategists concerned about their national position being endangered by some great power threat 20-30 years down the road. China, as a rising power, and Russia, as a re-imperialized power, both are cited as likely candidates for harbouring such an attempt. The NATO enlargement, American-Japanese Defense Guidelines, and development of the National Missile Defense System (NMD) and Theater Missile Defense System (TMD) all reflect American strategic considerations.

Despite a skeptical psychology by instinct towards China’s stunning economic growth, American political circles haven’t formed a consensus on the possibility of Chinese expansionism in the future. If they do, it could adopt a containment policy.

So far, the engagement policy has been shakily adhered to by the Clinton Administration that has worked so arduously to manage improvement of Sino American relations in these past two years. Jiang Zeming’s Washington trip, and Clinton’s Beijing visit, symbolically consolidated the foundation of the constructive strategic partnership and accelerated the regular exchange of visits by other high-ranking officials and officers. However, this framework is so fragile and unsubstantial that it could not unwaveringly resist American conservative animosity, American political party rivalry, and social media prejudice against China. Nor could it ameliorate Chinese strategic concern about American unilateralism, which has been exacerbated by US bombardment of Yugoslavia and the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade.

Therefore, the difference and controversy between two countries, embedded in their structural distinction and incongruous interest goal, could not be ironed out easily by several summit talks and leaders’ purely cooperative intent. The view of the China threat and support for containment sells well and is prevalent in America whenever the atmosphere is ripe for it, or some other appropriate event occurs.

Hence, it is necessary to examine all the vital factors affecting the trends of Sino-American relations realistically and objectively, especially the possibility of a Chinese challenge and the implication of a future shift in power between the two countries’positions, rectifying some misconceptions and incorrect reflection. Otherwise, any activity taken by either side would be exaggerated or read as an intended challenge, provocation and expansionary plot, which might follow a pattern similar to the start of the cold war that was miscalculated first by two long telegrams written respectively by Kennan and Novikov.1199506