In the conference agenda, the session on Russian-Chinese relations is formulated rather cautiously. The formulation of “Reliable Partnership” is followed by a question mark. In our view, however, the nature and prospects of this partnership are of paramount significance.

First, partnership and strategic interaction between Russia and China is dictated by the objective coincidence or similarity of the two powers’strategic interests. For several centuries of their relations, the two sides have accumulated the valuable experience of multifaceted cooperation, interaction and co-existence. Basing thereupon, they have developed a profound understanding of the commonality of their historical destinies, put a priority on constructive cooperation and tasks of co-development, as well as gained joint experience in standing by their respective national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. The importance of this experience has grown especially in the second half of the 20th century. The lessons of the 20-year alienation and confrontation of the’60s and’70s have taught a lot to the two nations, as they have shown how detrimental ideological exaggeration of various partial disagreements and differences in approach can be for the vital interests of the two powers. In the following decades, however, the two countries within a short period of time, have managed to go down the road from a mutual statement of normalization to good-neighbor cooperation, a confident partnership and a strategic cooperation turned toward the 21st century. Such successful development of their political relationship proves that the two sides have learned the proper lessons and have drawn the proper conclusions from their dramatic experience of the, 60s and’70s.

Second, neither the foreseeable future nor the current course of international relations shows any objective or serious subjective prerequisites, which could threaten the further essential progress of strategic interaction and partnership between Russia and China. This circumstance is supported by the fact that in the forthcoming decade both Russia and China would be concerned primarily by resolution of their respective domestic problems of progressive development of economy, culture, population welfare and national modernization at large. Hence, each of the countries is interested in a favorable international environment and, at the same time, in maximal use of one another’s mutually supplementing potentials for co-development as well as for consolidation and improvement of their good-neighbor cooperation and strategic partnership.

Third, the external political climate, in which Russia and China are to interact, motivates both countries to see their partnership exactly in the strategic context. The reason is that certain circles in the West-in particular, the NATO led by the United States-have put forward their doctrine of international security, based on continuation of the force-pressure policy and NATO’s absolute domination not only in the Euro-Atlantic region but in other regions of the world. U. S. defense blocs and alliances with some Asian countries, Japan especially, are also being interpreted in the terms extended to the region where the given alliance is located. At the same time, unilateral efforts are being taken in order to undermine the authority of such international organizations as the United Nations and international agreements that used to regulate the process of disarmament, prohibition of nuclear weapons and tests thereof, ban on ABM tests, etc. Additional evidence is seen in the unwillingness of the U. S. Senate to ratify the international agreement on the ban of nuclear tests, as well as the intention of the U. S. administration to build its own ABM system both globally and the TMD in East Asia.

The Russian and, may I assume, the Chinese side, cannot but feel concerned by the fact that certain circles in the West fan up the atmosphere of hatred towards these two powers and try to disseminate the myth about some “common threat to the civilized world.” At the same time, the global-scale build-up of tools for total pressure on, and containment of, these two countries is obvious. As evidenced by the experience of Yugoslavia and provocation bombing of the PRC Embassy in Belgrade, these measures are not limited by a mere demonstration of force, but sometimes take a form of direct military pressure.

Proceeding from the above, Russia, while taking care of her security and her dignity, cannot but draw the relevant conclusions for her foreign policy. It should be emphasized, however, that the Russia-China strategic interaction and confidential partnership does not at all imply formation of any institutionalized blocs or alliances. Russia (as well as China) voices her negative attitude to the policy of force pressure and hegemony, and does not seek to move her political discussion and dialogue with Western partners to the level of confrontation. We prefer the mode of negotiations and attainment of mutually committed agreements on security, arms control, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, ban of nuclear tests and unilateral development of various ABM systems that undermine the security balance between and among powers.

As for cooperation in the fields of finance, economy and resources, the renowned trend of our Western partners to use every case in order to enforce all sorts of economic and financial sanctions and direct pressure methods cannot but motivate Russia to diversify her economic and financial channels of cooperation. This’too, serves as a reason for Russia and China to seek and to find mutually acceptable and mutually beneficial forms of cooperation in the financial and economic spheres.

Thus it is evident that the confidential partnership and strategic interaction between Russia and China not only is important for their bilateral relations but has a geopolitical global dimension as well. As far as the latter point is concerned, the partnership is based on the powers’common perception of the ways for development of the world community and formation of the new international order that would meet the interests of all members of the world community.

In our view, the new world order, being formed in the context of globalization of international relations and economic cooperation, should serve the interests of life support and survival for all nations, as well as constructive co-existence and ecological security of various civilizations. This perception generates the need to take account of the objective trend for formation of the multipolar world. These circumstances seem to open new opportunities for democratization and humanization of international relations. The given approach, quite logically, runs counter to the selfish drive for domination and superpower hegemony as manifested by a certain group of countries.

In terms of its historic role, the strategic link of Russia and China is a major factor in resolution of the epochal task, the core of which is peace, security and development, and hence dignified survival of the whole human race with all of its ethnic, cultural and confessional diversity. There is no reason to doubt that this link of Russia and China eventually would be transformed into a broad anti-hegemony movement of nations which, in turn, would counterbalance the global forces that, having preserved the cold war mentality, continue to resort to the bloc-and-force policy. As a result, the necessary prerequisites would appear to help the world community to overcome the general crisis of industrial civilization and to find cardinal solutions of current global problems. These solutions are to be based on consensus and serve the interests of the entire global community rather than just the part there of whose economic and military might is prevailing now.

In this connection it seems appropriate to mention the recently emerging idea of forming a strategic triangle of Russia, China, and India as an instrument to stabilize the situation in Eurasia and to consolidate peace in the world at large. So far, the concept is under consideration of the extent to which it might be acceptable for all three parties and of the specific forms of its practical realization. The idea as such, however, is timely, viable and will be realized inevitably, should the West intensify its “civilizing” activity in the world and especially in Eurasia-the activity that is based on the use of various means of violence and leads to violation of both human rights and sovereign rights of most nations of the world.

The inner reserves for development of the Russia-China strategic partnership are laid down in the two countries’real potentials and needs in mutual contacts, exchange and multifaceted cooperation. So far, these enormous and diversified reserves have been used more or less broadly in the political, diplomatic and international spheres, as well as in the sphere of defense and joint efforts, taken by the two countries for consolidation of their security. The same trend has been developed profoundly in forming the atmosphere of friendship, good-neighborliness and confidence-building measures. Such broad use of the reserves per se a firm proof of the fact that Russian-Chinese bilateral relations now are free from any serious and irresolvable problems.

Russian-Chinese understanding and cooperation in formation of the new multipolar world is a point of significant importance. Apart from the declaring their strive for a just international order, the two countries by the very practice of their relations show the efficiency of such cooperation. Ample evidence is seen in the series of both bilateral and multilateral documents, signed on the initiative of Russia and China. These include military confidence-building measures to be taken in the border areas, reduction of armed forces across the border, and various forms of multilateral cooperation in the border areas with the neighbor countries. With Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan having joined the club, a kind of a model has been developed which helps to build confidence in the sphere of security and to solve such difficult problems as border issues. In our view, the experience of the Shanghai Five is of paramount importance for settlement of the most difficult problems of Asia, where the complicated territorial and border issues are still waiting to be resolved by almost40countries.

A noteworthy point is connected with another aspect of Russia-China strategic interaction-the approach to construction of a new international order. In the joint communique, signed by President Boris Yeltsin and Chairman Jiang Zemin, Russia and China consider the new multipolar international order both in the geopolitical and civilization-related terms. As emphasized in the statement, the future multipolar world must become the world of cooperation, interaction and mutual influence of various civilizations, and should not be viewed as the world where the diversity of civilizations would be reduced to domination of one culture and system of values.

Regrettably, so far the potentials of development in the sphere of trade and economic relations between the two countries have been used least actively. For different objective and subjective reasons, Russia and China have been unable to increase the volume of trade to the targeted 20 billion USD by 2000. A number of the signed trade and economic agreements, too, have not been implemented. However, both Moscow and Beijing perfectly understand the key importance of their economic cooperation for the further progress of the whole complex of strategic partnership between Russia and China. Therefore they multiply their efforts in order to overcome the actual stagnation in the sphere of economic cooperation and to bring it to the same level as the one of their political relationship.

The difficulties, which hamper the further growth of Russian-Chinese economic relations, have been predetermined by the following objective circumstances. First, the renown economic disorder in Russia; rapid decline in production by almost all sectors of Russia’s economy; destruction of mechanisms of planned economy and immaturity of market instruments to regulate the domestic and foreign economic activities. Second, Russia started to restore economic with the China at the time when the latter was using her major foreign-economy potentials in the other (mostly, Western) directions. Third, being in the already unfavorable environment, the Russian-Chinese economic relations were hit heavily by the acute financial crisis of 1997 in East Asia.

Apart from the latter one, the above-cited circumstances would render a lasting effect. Therefore, the two countries have to seek actively some new approach for the multifaceted development of their economic cooperation, which is a matter of strategic timeliness. The search has begun already, and there is a promise of tangible results.

The best prospects are seen in the joint realization of major projects. These include conventional and atomic energy, peaceful exploration of outer space and the use of space research in the interests of mankind, construction of gas and oil pipelines, and energy transfer from East and West Siberia to China. Realization of these projects would consolidate the economic pillar of strategic cooperation and provide an additional powerful impulse to development of the vast adjacent areas of the two states-in particular, by creating favorable conditions for influx of investments from third countries. Besides, all this would facilitate general improvement of economic situation in Northeast Asia. Such outcome is of tremendous importance-for China especially.

The above grand projects are now at different stages of feasibility study or realization. All in all, they would increase the volume of Russian-Chinese trade by many billion dollars. Taken alone, the value of the general agreement on construction of the Lianyungang atomic power plant (signed in 1997) is estimated as 3.6 billion USD.

Joint ventures in the high-tech fields of production promise high efficiency in inciting economic ties between the two countries. Programs for joint production of digital telephone stations are already being realized successfully, and the agreement has been reached to establish joint ventures in Russia for assembly of colored TV-sets and home air-conditioners. China is regarded as among the world leaders in production of these and other consumer electronics.

What is most important, the two countries have reached and start to realize practically their common understanding of the fact that their broad cooperation in the science-tech sphere and exchange with advanced technologies should become a major vector of their bilateral ties. The value of contracts in this sphere exceeded the mark of 1.9 billion USD in 1998. However, the potential is actually unlimited and is growing constantly owing to the increase of China’s science-tech potential and a certain amelioration and revitalization of Moscow’s science-tech policy.

As economic relations are planned to catch up with the political ones, the growth of cooperation in the military-tech sphere plays and is expected to play the ever more notable role. Like India, China has been and is a major importer of Russian weaponry and military equipment for a long time. While cooperating in this field on the mutually beneficial basis, Russia abides by certain principles, such as: no detriment to Russia’s own security; strict compliance with the undertaken international commitments; non-violation of the established balance of forces in East Asia; and transparency of Russia’s military-tech ties with the China. This approach rests upon the common understanding of the two sides which has been in the Russian-Chinese Memorandum on military-tech cooperation, signed as early as on December 18, 1992. It seems that cooperation of the two countries in this sphere would inevitably acquire a broader scope and a new quality, should the US-Japan plan for TMD in Northeast Asia be outlined in more practical and tangible terms, and be realized in a step-by-step fashion, thus destroying the established balance of forces in the region. This would pose a qualitatively new threat to the security of Russia and China.

In the aggregate, motivations for strategic partnership are generated by the needs of development and co development of the two countries, as well as the real and potential threats especially of the military sort, which come mainly from the West. All these are such that the multifaceted development of a strategic partnership quite logically becomes the priority task of Russia and China. There is only one statement to be made firmly: formation of the Cool Peace is not a choice of either Russia or China; rather, the responsibility is to be placed solely with the West. As for the Russia-China relationship of strategic partnership, it has been generated by their sincere willingness to overcome the Cold War mentality in the world and to form an international environment that would be most favorable for the progress, prosperity and equal security of the nations of Russia and China as well as all other nations of the globe.

A point of special importance is that having a long experience of history, Russia and China would no longer let the West manipulate them by using the notorious divide-and-rule policy which, alas, happened to be quite successful in the’60s and’70s. But, as Russians use to say, “every bad thing has a good point”. The negative consequences, caused by that “success” to Russia (USSR) and China, are well remembered by the peoples and leaders of the two countries, and therefore none of those would “swallow” the bait of the West.

By now, the formation and initial development of the Russia-China strategic partnership has quite amply manifested the efficiency of such a format for relations as a means to facilitate good-neighborliness and codevelopment of the two countries. It is also a means to protect their respective vital interests from outside interference. And it serves as a factor of the epochal striving for establishment of a lasting and fair international political and economic order.

Already well-established, the new model of Russian-Chinese relations and the fundamental principles of their improvement guarantee the possibility to overcome any problems which exist between the two countries or could appear in the course of their own future development or evolution of the external situation. It would be odd to forecast that the Russia-China strategic partnership will be all sugar and honey. National interests as well as positions of the two great powers cannot coincide always by one hundred per cent. However, rather than the inevitable partial difference and disagreements, the objective common vital interests will determine the mainstream of RussiaChina interaction in the sphere of their bilateral relations as well as in the spheres of the regional and global policies.

My optimism with regard to partnership of the two powers is free from any unreasonable illusion or wishful thinking. Rather, it is based on nothing else but the sober consideration of the current realities and future trends of international policy and objective assessment of profound vital interests of the great neighbor states.