1.Introduction：corporate acquisitions and changes of control—friendly and hostile—as a critical aspect of monitoring and restructuring in a functioning capital market with a developing market for corporate control.

2.PRC regulation of listed company acquisitions：a.Securities regulatory agency（CSRC）-led “business regulation” style system；

b.Modified UK（London City Code）system and modified “mandatory offer” adopted；and

c.Ample provision for fiduciary duties/good faith-type inquiries：see for example Listed Company Acquisition Measures（2006）：Articles 3，6，7，8，9，32，and 80.

3.Why the following are not sufficient to ensure target directors’ performance of their corporate fiduciary duties：904382a.Ensuring complete and accurate disclosure by acquiring company；

b.Procurement of a “fairness”-type opinion by an “independent” financial firm；

c.Providing a recommendation on shareholder acceptance of offer；

d.Negotiating the best acquisition terms for the shareholders’ interest；and

e.Prohibition against management of acquirer and target acting in concert.

4.Why the following are not sufficient to protect target company shareholders：a.Acquiring company mandatory disclosure；

b.Securities regulatory agency（CSRC）review and oversight；

c.Modified mandatory offer or “same price” mechanisms；and

d.Ex post securities regulatory agency（CSRC）monitoring.

5.PRC Company Law（2006）-new Article 148，greater（normative）“justiciability” [kesuxing] of China’s Company，and application in the change of control context.

6.China’s developing market for corporate control after “guquan fenzhi”，expansion of QFII program，“haigui” A share listings of offshore-listed PRC-capital companies，and the rise of independent（non-SOE system）PRC-capital investment funds and institutional investors.

7.Possibilities for shareholder-initiated litigation in the change of control context：a.Contra：People’s Courts limited acceptance of company limited by shares [gufen youxian gongsi] and listed company-related cases（for example，refusal of Shanghai Higher People’s Courts to accept or allow hearing of shareholders’ suits seeking to invalidate board or shareholders’ resolutions for listed companies，notwithstanding 2006 PRC Company Law，Article 22）；904383

b.Contra：lack of Supreme People’s Court “Judicial Explanation” or “Regulations” on（i）corporate fiduciary duties（especially “duty of care” [qinmian yiwu]），（ii）derivative actions，etc.，all authorized in 2006 PRC Company Law；

c.Pro：rise of shareholder litigation on fraudulent or misleading disclosure as a model for understanding the justiciability of challenges to takeover defenses and recommendations to shareholders in the PRC；

d.Pro：PRC Supreme People’s Court reaction to rise of shareholder litigation on fraudulent or misleading disclosure（after Supreme People’s Court “ban”on accepting the same cases）-The Supreme People’s Court’s Several Rules on Civil Compensation Cases Arising from False Disclosure Involving the Securites Markets of December 26，2002；

e.Pro：increased competence and sophistication of China’s People’s Courts regarding justiciable corporate law and securities law questions；

f.Analogize：Japan’s regulation of takeover defenses，and administrative agency direction for judicial evaluation standards，or “Unocal With Japanese Characteristics”，as a model for China’s own mandated explanation？

g.Analyze：How might a PRC jurisprudence on challenges to takeover defenses/recommendations look？

h.Analyze：How should a PRC jurisprudence on challenges to takeover defenses/recommendations look？

i.Analyze：How different might a PRC jurisprudence on takeover/recommendations challenges be from the United States and Japan，Western Europe？

8.Conclusion-ensuring efficient restructuring in a market for corporate control.