From the viewpoint of the United States the end of the cold war and the acceleration of globalization in the 1990s have ruled out old notions of “strategic triangles” or new ones of “multipolarity.” With this in mind, Americans think that Russia should pursue global integration, not great power maneuvering.1199542 Attempts to see the world in transition to a new geopolitics of conflicting poles are rejected as rationalizations for failure, or even worse, as threats of destabilization by power holders deflecting blame from their own corrupt seizure of the national wealth.1199543 By contrast, in Russia where the forces of globalization are viewed more negatively and memories of the Soviet era evoke nostalgia for Moscow’s great power influence, notions of multipolarity are eagerly embraced.1199544 Not having experienced the benefits of global integration, Russians take solace in balance of power frameworks as a means to regain influence and as a check on abuse of American power. Given these conflicting worldviews, how can policy makers in Washington and Moscow find common ground in dealings with the world’s great powers, including each other? This paper examines how the experiences of 1996-99 prepare these two capitals to reconcile different images of great power relations.

Through the1990s the three principal bilateral issues in Russo-US relations have been financial assistance in support of shared goals, mutual arms reduction, and NATO expansion. For all three Europe is the foremost multilateral arena. That is where NATO is newly active, the breakup of Yugoslavia has brought open warfare, and the European Union works closely with the US on economic ties. Given this range of issues, Russia has often appeared through the prism of a unified West beckoning or rejecting it rather than in a broader great power context. This paper turns to the unsettled environment of Asia as an alternate framework for understanding Russo-US relations.1199545 In Asia the US-Russian ties are less direct, fewer alliances are available to give the US leverage, and great power maneuvering has become more intense. The powers vie over territory, arms buildups, and power vacuums in Asia. In the long term, Asia, where four great powers intersect, will reveal more about the struggle between US notions of globalization and Russian calls for multipolarity than will a Europe in the process of integration and close to the US.

Supposedly, Washington and Moscow continue to be guided by a “strategic partnership” in which elements of cooperation predominate. But this concept has lost its meaning, both because of conflicting policies and because as the 1990s proceeded neither Americans nor Russians attached much substance to it. On the Russian side, many blame the US for the failure of reform in the1990s and the collapse of much that was positive in their lives. They assume that if the US had provided the expected assistance, the Russian economy would not have fallen into an abyss, and that if the US had honored its commitments Russia’s voice as a great power would still resound around the world. It follows that America has lost its right to be treated as a partner, whereas China can be because it is ready to cooperate to resist the US. Meanwhile, Americans have largely abandoned hope in Russia’s transformation, turning instead to casting blame about “who lost Russia.” Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush’s main foreign policy adviser, recently commented, “Our big mistake was in assuming we would have a strategic partnership. In that regard, we were spoiled-by getting so much from them so early. What we now face in international politics is a Russia more dangerous than it has been, because it is coining apart.”1199546 With her encouragement and the impact of a new money-laundering scandal, House Republicans (and in the coming elections, it is likely, Bush as well) are accusing the Clinton-Gore administration of losing Russia, similar to the charge by Republicans in 1952 that the Truman administration had lost China. In the midst of presidential elections in Russia and the US, mutual criticisms may be fueled. Meanwhile, differing responses to developments in Asia, such as tensions with North Korean, may demonstrate how little of a “strategic partnership” remains in a multilateral context.

This paper examines Russo-US relations within three great power contexts to determine the impact of differing worldviews and prospects for finding common ground. These are: 1) the US-Russo-Japanese triangle; 2) the US-Russo-Chinese triangle; and3) theU S-Russo-Sino-Japanese quadrangle. Although at first glance the positions of Russia and China on multipolarity and of the US and Japan on globalization appear similar, it is best to conceive of a continuum with Russia at one end and the US at the other. This continuum can be clearly seen after Moscow formed a strategic partnership with Beijing in accord with logic explained by Evgenii Primakov, first as foreign minister and then prime minister, and Washington had agreed with Tokyo on new defense guidelines. Instability in relations between Washington and Beijing and a precarious effort to normalize relations between Moscow and Tokyo characterize these years and are likely to remain the defining conditions of the first decade of the coming century.