Separated by the Pacific Ocean, both Russia and the United States regard East Asian security as its major foreign policy goal. As an integral part of the region, the two countries maintain close political and economic ties with East Asian states, have a sizable military contingent deployed in the Pacific and consider this part of the world a sphere of their national interests. However, the regional status of the two countries considerably differs, along with an array of goals following from national security needs, and the means for reaching these goals.

Since the early 1990s, the polarization of international relations has been replaced by a dynamic balance based on economic might rather than on military power, and almost everywhere socialist ideology has been replaced by the principles of democracy and market economy. Cold war confrontation has been replaced by formation of new political configurations. In East Asia, the direct threat of global war disappeared with the demise of the USSR. Russia normalized and developed its relations with China, and increased political contacts with Japan. As a result, Russia’s security environment in the Far East has improved to the point where the threat of direct all-out assault can be disregarded for the foreseeable future. But at the same time, the threat of global confrontation with the United States and a regional clash with China was replaced with a sharp decrease of economic possibilities, and regional and domestic uncertainties.

In the period of the cold war, relations between Moscow and Washington were the main factor in international relations. The demise of the USSR and collapse of socialism in Europe drastically changed the world power balance, In the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet Union’s economic indicators were comparable with the Japanese and considerably exceeded the Chinese. In the decade afterward, the process of economic slowdown resulted in a drastic backlog of Russia. At the present time, Russia is compelled to manage its affairs from a position of relative weakness.

Changes in economic indicators of four Pacific countries (1990-1997)

At the same time, Russia’s leadership in its diplomacy has not always felt the changes in the economic and power balance. Russia’s relations with the U. S. had a very optimistic start. Ideas of security from Vancouver to Vladivostok were inherited by Russia’s diplomacy, but real life turned out to be more complicated. Russia lost its position in Europe and faced a NATO enlargement, its economic reforms failed, and the role of Moscow in world affairs seriously diminished. The dichotomy between a residual super power mentality, and the country’s shrinking political and military influence tightly connected with poor economic performance, is one of the main features of present Russian policy.

For a number of years, there had been indications that Russian-American relations were coming to a crisis. In the spring of 1999, these relations fell to a state worse than at any previous time since the end of the cold war. This crisis is not only limited to Kosovo, but encompasses all three dimensions of Russian-American, as well as Russian-Western relations-economic issues, regional security problems and arms control. Fortunately for the Asian policy of both countries, the main contradictions between Moscow and Washington are mainly concentrated not in Asia, but in the Atlantic region.

Russia is the richest country in the world; it possesses creative and welleducated people; it has tremendous natural resources; and it occupies a very important geographic position linking Europe and Asia. But the inability of Moscow to find a solution, which would allow the integration of Russia into the post-cold war international system, is something for which both Russia and the West may pay a very serious price. It’s not surprising that domestic turmoil did not allow Moscow to develop a comprehensive foreign policy strategy. Unlike the Soviet Union, Russia is not a superpower with global interests and power projection capabilities. Its military power has dramatically declined, its economy is in disarray. The Russian Federation found itself semi-isolated in world affairs where it has no reliable allies and partners. Internal weaknesses make it very difficult for Russia to ensure her legitimate national interests and establish a meaningful role in the post-cold war international system.

For the West the key challenge is whether the West wants to admit Russia as an equal and responsible participant, while for Russia the key challenge is whether it wants to be integrated. Russia needs to achieve integration into the global market and ease its enormous debt burden. Moscow also wants to resolve a number of questions connected to the continued trade discrimination of Russia and create more favorable conditions for attraction of badly needed Western investments and technologies, which this country requires to overcome its unprecedented economic crisis. It is necessary to achieve a full participation of Russia in such international institutions as the G-8, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, the World Trade Organization, etc., and define Moscow’s relations with the main regional economic coalitions-the European Union and the APEC.

Moscow needs to maintain the stability of the Russian-US military relationship despite the lack of parity in economic and other spheres. It is essential to reduce to a minimum the direct military consequences of the expansion of NATO, preventing an even greater change of military balance disadvantaging Russian. It also requires the necessary arrangements to maintain the stability of strategic offensive-defensive balance with the United States.

As was already mentioned, interaction between Russia and the U. S. in Asia is important but not the main part of bilateral relations. First of all, it is connected with the fact that although Russia’s diplomacy applied specific measures to develop its Asian-Pacific policy, its main field of activity is still in the Atlantic. Analysis of current Russian diplomacy shows that its main task is to compel the United States and other Western countries to recognize the legitimate interests of Russia. Economically this means the integration of Russia into the global market and an easing of its debt burden. Politically it means involvement of the country in European affairs. Militarily it means that, after the expansion of NATO, Russia seeks stability of military relations with the West, despite the lack of parity in economic and other spheres. This requires achieving the consent of NATO to full participation of Russia in decision-making on the key questions of European security through a special Russia-NATO political mechanism, as one of the key components of the new European security architecture.

All these important tasks have no direct connection with Russia’s interests in Asia where its regional economic position is very weak. Among Russia’s main creditors, there are no Asian countries. Russia, at least formally, is a member of the principal Asian regional organizations. There is no need to fight for the admittance of Russia’s vote in the decision making process, as is happening in Europe, because there is no such process in Asia. Russia still keeps relatively strong military positions in the Far East, although NATO is approaching Russia from the West, and not from the East. All these considerations unfortunately put Russia’s Asian policy on the backbumer of its diplomacy.

At the same time there is a clear understanding among politicians and academics in Russia that the country needs diplomacy oriented not only toward the West but the East as well. Ideally it should not be a gambling strategy of opposing West-oriented relations with East-oriented relations, as from time to time happens in Russian foreign policy. In reality, Moscow’s current diplomacy shows signs of confrontation between so-called Westerners and Easterners. First of all, it is connected with the complexities of domestic policy. Until January 1996, when Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev resigned, Russian diplomacy was considered by the opposition as pro-Western. This diplomacy had more of an ideological character than a geographical meaning.

All miscalculations and errors of the reforms in the minds of the public are tightly connected with such politicians as Mikhail Gorbachev, who in fact started democratic reforms in the USSR, Egor Gaidar and other representatives of the right wing of Russia’s political spectrum. Diplomacy before 1996 was constantly accused by the neo communist and nationalist opposition of being ready to make real and imagined concessions to the U. S. and European countries. The “multipolar world” concept, proclaimed by new foreign minister Yevgeney Primakov, included an obvious anti-American bent, which was described as a “struggle against American hegemony.” At the same time, what was (and still is) on the minds of many Russian politicians is revival of Soviet superpower status, which considerably shrunk after the collapse of the USSR and during the first decade of the existence of Russia. In diplomatic practice it meant increased tension between Russia and the Western world, and efforts to develop relations with the opponents of the West. The most vivid example of such efforts was Primakov’s threats to create a strategic anti-Western alliance with China and India during his visit to India in December 1998, which for obvious reasons received a very cool response both in Beijing and Delhi.

Unfortunately, the economic and political necessity of a multi-directional policy is substituted by an ideological and rather scholastic discussion about choice between Washington and Beijing, or between London and Belgrade. The importance of facing the East for Russia is obviously important for many reasons. First, Russia shares a border of more than four thousand kilometers with China. Second, the Russian Far East’s economic ties, for many reasons, are more and more oriented toward the Asia-Pacific, and in the future there are chances that this part of Russia will be integrated into the region. At the present time the survival of the region is considerably connected with the economy of the region. Third, the security of the Far East is part of the security of Russia. The Asian-Pacific region is an arena of nuclear deployment for both Russia and the U. S. as well as China. That is why problems of arms control and proliferation of arms of mass destruction are very important for the region including Russia. Fourth, in the future Russia, with its unique geographic position and already existing transportation and communication facilities, could become a natural bridge between Asia and Europe.

With regard to the U. S., its regional interests are largely determined by deep economic involvement in Asia, supported by a system of forward deployment, including strategic forces. The influence over East Asia exerted by the United States for the last third of the 20th century has come to dominate the political, military and economic life of the region. The U. S, still retains the cold wax framework of military-political treaties, which rests on the two main pillars of the US-Japan Security Treaty (1951) and the US-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty (1953). According to the provisions of the treaties’46, 000American servicemen are stationed in Japan, while South Korea houses 38,000. In economic terms’U. S. regional status is rooted primarily in the direct and portfolio investment that reaches almost a trillion dollars, and in the 40% share of U. S. foreign trade hosted by East Asia, which provides2to3million Americans with work.

At the same time the economic presence of Russia in the Asia-Pacific is negligible, its regional political influence is also not very substantial and its policy in this area faces a number of uncertainties. Some of these uncertainties are common for all of the Asia-Pacific community; and some have indigenous Russian traits. Among the “common” uncertainties, there is the future of China, possible developments on the Korean peninsula, economic trends of the region, the future of American regional policy and its relations with the main actors on the regional scene. The “indigenous” uncertainties are tightly connected with three main features of Russia’s current policy in the Asian-Pacific.

First, on the ladder of Moscow’s political preferences, Asia still occupies a not very high position. For many years the foreign, economic, and trade policy of Russia was oriented toward Europe, while Siberia and the Far East were considered a source of raw materials for the industry of the European part of the country. As a rule, even the goods produced in the Far East were used behind the Urals. Nowadays Russia, having only a quarter of its territory in Europe remains completely oriented on trade with the West. Trade with Asia is less than 20% of its commodity circulation, and trade with the Asia-Pacific is less than 10%. In the trade of Asia-Pacific countries in the 1990s, the share of Russia was constantly less than 1%.

Second, it is not completely clear what is the main goal of Russia’s Asian policy. Except for common words about the “Asian21st century,” the necessity of being good neighbors with Asian countries and the development of relations with them, there is no concrete vision of the future stance of Russia in the dynamic Asian picture.

This uncertainty is tightly connected with the third feature of Russian policy. Economic weakness and the relative absence of political stability give little possibility for a clear and sustainable policy in Asia. The government is more preoccupied with the current and future problems of the North Caucasus and possible financial default than with its relations with Beijing or Tokyo.

One of the main uncertainties, which Russia faces together with the U. S. and the rest of the world, is future developments within China. It is necessary to stress that for Russia, with its long border with China, the future of bilateral relations has special meaning. China might become a factor for regional instability.

The end of the 1990s saw China’s transformation from a political lightweight in the global Soviet-American antagonism into a fully independent and significant factor in global politics. In the 21st century, both Russia and the United States are likely to zero in on China to the prejudice of their mutual concern. Russian security is continuously burdened with a long border with China, present trends of economic and even military developments of Russia and China show quite opposite directions-Russia is still on its way down, China is increasing its potential. In the most optimistic scenario, Russia will need at least 10-15 years to reach its pre-reform level. Strong, but still overpopulated China on the borders of an economically weak Russian Far East with its7millions of population can be a potential threat to the security of Russia. The United States might eventually see China as a peer economic competitor and, perhaps, a threat to regional interests of its own and its allies. In terms of security, Russia and the United States view China from different angles. Nevertheless, even while declaring a willingness to promote relations with the PRC, they share a certain anxiety for their prospects.

For Russia, as well as for the United States, a policy of engagement with China is complicated by uncertainty about China’s future and its possible role in the system of international relations. There are two mainstream possible scenarios for development of China: it could grow into a superpower, or it could become unstable. As a matter of fact neither scenario seems favorable for Russia.

In a worst case scenario, a full-scale crisis in China is fraught with adverse effects for Russia, including the possibility of confrontation. China could become a destabilizing factor in the Asia-Pacific, although hypothetical scenarios of this outcome are not well articulated and are by no means certain. But the cumulative effect of China’s domestic problems, which have piled up for decades, could be devastating. China is a country with a relatively poor population, an extremely uneven social structure, and an undeveloped mass consciousness. China faces countless problems and contradictions. Among these are the shortage of living space, a very high level of unemployment, ethnic conflicts exacerbated by an economic gap between the western and eastern provinces as well as between the coastal and inland areas, and the mounting need to modernize its outdated political system. Any Chinese attempt to resolve a social crisis based on ideological control over the economy or separatism could give rise to a totalitarian state and would inevitably worsen relations with Russia.

Despite the fact that Russia’s introversion prevents it from concentrating on the present and the prospects of China and Russian-Chinese relations and all the uncertainties about the future of China, there is a steady progress in Russia-PRC relations. One of the most important achievements of the start of perestroika diplomacy was recovery of good relations with China, started with the ill-fated visit of Gorbachev to Beijing on the threshold of Tiananmen events in 1989. After decades of hostility both countries made a decision to normalize relations and the last ten years have demonstrated successes of such a policy. The parties have managed to overcome ideological contradictions and establish friendly and businesslike relations. In the period 1992-1999, leaders of Russia and China had more than ten summit meetings, and signed a number of important political documents determining border security and development of bilateral relations. In April 1996 in Shanghai, leaders of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tadjikistan signed the first regional Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in Border Areas, and a year later in April in Moscow, leaders of the same countries signed the Treaty on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in Border Areas. In November 1997, Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin declared the demarcation of the eastern part of the common border implemented. As a result of joint initiatives, today the border disputes have largely been resolved, military equipment has been drawn back, and relationships focus more on development of resources than marshalling of forces.

One of the most important developments of bilateral relations was the reestablishment of trade relations, which practically started even before restoration of political relations. In April 1982 both countries signed the so-called “border trade agreement” which defined the terms of decentralized trade-interregional and border cooperation. Ten years later, in 1993 , border trade, as well as the volume of bilateral trade, reached its peak, and China became Russia’s second trade partner, after Germany, largely due to the regional exchange of goods. In 1993 the volume of trade between Russia and China reached $7.7 billion and unfortunately this peak was never surpassed.

Despite all the obvious successes in the development of bilateral political and security relations, they are not free from a number of problems. The Chinese, who have an inclination to describe phenomena in very precise figures, describe relations with Russia as “the two hots and the two colds”-“hot” is political ties and contacts between leaders of the two countries; “cold” is economic exchange and “grass roots” relations. It is necessary to add that from the security point of view, relations between the two countries also have some ambiguities. Developments are quite impressive, but in the political and security thinking of both countries, a potential threat from the other side is not excluded. This is partly connected with mutual misperceptions, partly with the realities of history, geography and demography. The main tacit question which is in the minds of many Russian politicians is the possibility of Chinese claims on the vast, but not very populated Far East, which due to the economic difficulties and political miscalculations, is increasingly losing its ties with the federal center.

If China should grow into a superpower or become destabilized, neither scenario seems favorable for Russia. A full-scale crisis in China is fraught with the most unfortunate after-effects for Russia, including the possibility of confrontation. Any attempts to resolve the social crisis rooted in affection for ideological control over the economy, in separatism or economic crisis will give rise to a totalitarian state and inevitably worsen relations with Russia. However, in case of a positive outcome for China, Russian and Chinese geopolitical interests might remain at variance. Strong, but still overpopulated China on the borders of an economically weak Russian Far East with its7millions of population can be a potential threat to the security of Russia. Even in the case that both sides will avoid territorial or demographic contradictions, Russian and Chinese geopolitical interests might substantially differ.

Should the Asia-Pacific be faced with a “China threat,” the position of Russia will be motivated by the state of its relations with other major countries in the region. It must be also mentioned that the Russian Far East, saddled by economic and demographic vulnerability might be easily targeted by China’s geopolitical pressure. However, regardless of China’s possible political zigzags, it is essential that Russian diplomatic efforts should be zeroed in on seeking conditions for lasting, stable and mutually beneficial relations with a powerful neighbor, rather than promulgating scenarios of geopolitical games. The possibility of bilateral confrontation can be nullified only by an economic build-up of Russia in general, and the Russian Far East in particular.

The possibility of China becoming a threat to regional and global security worries Moscow, as well as Washington. There are at least three scenarios in which use of military power seems possible. The first one features the Chinese armed forces suppressing domestic rebellions in areas populated by ethnic minorities, especially in Xinjiang, Tibet, or Inner Mongolia. In the second scenario, China uses military force against Taiwan. The third hypothetical scenario implies the use of Chinese armed forces for resolving territorial disputes with neighboring states. The possibility of a military clash between Russia and China in the framework of the third scenario is a concern for policy planners in Moscow, but at the present time is more remote than a potential Chinese drive toward the south.

If any of these scenarios came about, Russia would act in accordance with its national interests and would obviously do its best not to be drawn into conflicts. The painful experience of past confrontations with China, as well as its high vulnerability to Chinese geopolitical pressure, leaves Russia no choice. However, if a conflict involving China escalated, this could thoroughly shake the entire regional and global framework of international relations, forcing major powers to become actively involved in the conflict settlement. By staying outside their efforts, Russia would risk being further relegated to a secondary status. By taking part in the settlement, however, Russia might encounter problems of foreign policy priorities, and thus have to walk a diplomatic tightrope. In any case Russia should be very cautious in its arms export to China, who on the threshold of the century feels itself more and more as a great power.

Russia and China are not very interested in a U. S.-dominated unipolar world. Both countries are strong supporters of multipolarity, each having in mind its own leadership of one of the poles. However, their perceptions of future bilateral relations substantially differ. Where Russia is trying to convert their shared views into some kind of mutual and binding cooperation, China prefers a multilateral approach oriented toward discussion without commitment. China is ready to support multilateral security arrangements, but only in the framework of inter-state Asian organizations. China is thus trying to challenge existing bilateral U. S.-led security alliances and develop the prerequisites for multipolarity. It is difficult to say how far China will go in this policy of low-intensity competition with the United States, but it is quite obvious that a policy of alliances and blocs has little attraction for China.

In the immediate future, China is likely to retain its aversion to any kind of formal or virtual alliance. This decision has been prompted by both the stinging memory of colonial and “socialist” rule and down-to-earth reasons: China is too weak to have “junior partners,” yet too strong to fit this role itself. Russia’s horizons are, in contrast, still occupied by a network of alliances and blocs. Nostalgia for the “inviolable unity of the socialist countries,” its superpower status, and a feeling of constant threat are ever present in the mentality of Russian politicians.

China is even more consistent than Russia in rejecting Western-led collective intervention in the affairs of third countries, but the fact that both countries are against a U. S.-dominated world, and often vote together in the United Nations, does not mean that China supports any kind of collective response. It is quite clear that China will always try to avoid any kind of rigid involvement in Russian relations with the West. When Moscow tried to speculate on a possible alliance with China as a counterweight against NATO enlargement, China immediately denounced such intentions.

Kosovo had negative impact not only on the relations between Washington and Moscow. U. S. relations with China also were seriously damaged due to the developments in the Balkans. It happened not only because of the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. More dangerous for bilateral relations was the decision of Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui to make a statement in July 1999 that China should deal with Taipei on a “state to state” basis. It looks like the call was done on the basis of interpretation of Kosovo events as an example of the U. S. readiness to pursue interventionist policy in any place in the world. At the same time the Taiwanese president overestimated the worsening of Sino-American relations.

Tensions between China and the US escalated and the Clinton administration’s Chinese policy was under fire from its Republican opponents and critics. The problem of Taiwan was added to the spy case, human rights issues and other conflicts of bilateral relations. Discussion around relations with China was tightly connected with the beginning of the presidential campaign. The policy of ambiguity is critical for bilateral relations over the Taiwanese issue. This was called by David Shambaugh of George Washington University, in Washington “a critical element of deterrence” which helps “to keep the mainland guessing about what we would do and deter them from taking action”1199547 could cause very serious tensions between Washington and Beijing.

Since China regards Taiwan as a rebellious province, under no circumstances could China make such a commitment, which, strictly speaking, would call its sovereignty into question. China does not insist that the island immediately join the mainland and actively develop economic ties with it. But Beijing has repeatedly given Taiwan and the United States to understand that a proclamation of Taiwan’s independence would be completely unacceptable and would force it to use force to establish control over the island. This was shown by the 1996 crisis, when on the threshold of the elections in Taiwan, the United States responded to a demonstration of Chinese military might in the Taiwan Strait by bringing two aircraft carriers there. The problem of the island’s independence could be the cause of a serious military confrontation between the two countries.

It is quite clear that any form of Taiwanese independence will cause a very strong Chinese reaction, which will not exclude the use of force. To exclude that the U. S. should avoid any ambiguities in its policy toward Taipei and Beijing. The most simple way to do it is to say that the U. S. will never support the independence of Taiwan, but at the same time will preclude any attempts to unify China by military means.

The aforesaid facts prompt the following deduction. Since there is a possibility that China due to its inherent problems may trigger an instability in the Asia-Pacific, other major powers share a common interest not to push this possibility on the brink of reality, no matter willingly or unwillingly, directly or indirectly. Neither power could benefit from an instability caused by China. All of them stand to gain from a stable and confident China gradually solving its dilemmas and contradictions. In this sense the USA and Japan should welcome the progress of Russo-Chinese relations just as Russia should be confident enough to approve of the Sino-U. S. and Sino-Japanese rapprochement.

On the whole, it must be admitted that the present triangular framework of Russia-PRC-US (or a broadened quadrangular type-Russia-PRC-US-Japan) rests on a far more balanced foundation, than the logic of a‘zero sum game’of the past. For instance, Russia has no serious reasons to regard the improvement of the U. S.-Japan-China relations as a priori threatening to its interests. Accordingly, the United States and Japan could hardly feel apprehension about the expanding relationship between Russia and China. This dramatic change in strategic thinking can be explained by the following two reasons. Firstly, the United States and Russia have renounced their global competition, and, therefore, made H. Kissinger style’triangular diplomacy’of the late60s obsolete. (The fact that H. Kissinger himself still continues to promote his ideas merely proves the former Secretary of State to be sort of old-fashioned). Secondly, it is essentially important that Russia, the USA and the rest of the world seem to have given up the idea of playing the “China card”. China has produced convincing arguments that it wields enough power, will and good sense to avoid being a‘card, in somebody’s hands. To say that China is free to determine the limits of its relations with any other state is hardly an exaggeration.

The end of the cold war and disintegration of the USSR substantially decreased fears of a “Soviet military threat,” upon which Japanese military doctrine was based and required a new concept of security in the region. This was reflected in the U. S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security signed by U. S. President Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Hasimoto in April 1996, which confirmed the role of the security treaty in maintenance of peace and stability in the region. In September 1997, both parties adopted the joint document. Guidelines for the U. S.-Japan Defense Cooperation replaced a similar document of 1978.

Although the Document did not mention the Korean peninsula and Taiwan as a sphere of joint action, the statements of Japanese officials confirmed the readiness to expand the framework of the Treaty. These two areas caused a sharply negative reaction in China and DPRK and were not too much welcomed in Seoul. Japan was immediately accused of militarism with the intention to carryout an aggressive policy. It was not only a reaction to the Japanese rather timid attempt to expand the framework of possible interaction between the two countries, but also a preventive action against possible activation of the Japanese regional policy.

For China the expansion of American-Japanese cooperation beyond the framework of national borders is meant as a reaction to China’s obvious drive toward superpower status. It was noted that even in the Guidelines of 1978 which had an obvious anti-Soviet character there was nothing said about expansion of the cooperation. What this means from the Chinese point of view is that the “China threat” is considered more important than the Soviet. The appearance of Guidelines at the time of crisis in the Taiwan Strait intensified Chinese fears. The Chinese painful reaction to the Guidelines was even more acute than their reaction to the American military demonstration at the Taiwan Strait, reflecting that the prospects of a Japanese military independence is considered more dangerous than a U. S. military presence in the region. It is connected first of all with the Chinese historical experience and ambiguity regarding Japanese military developments.

However, the modernization of the American-J apanese alliance collides with many more problems and difficulties than the same processes in Europe. In East Asia there is no multilateral allied structure similar to NATO. American involvement in maintenance of security in this region is realized through bilateral treaties and agreements. The puffing up with all the rumors about the coming transformation of bilateral agreements into some form of collective security system has nothing to do with reality. Eventually even the closest American allies-Japan and South Korea due to well known circumstances-are not ready for bilateral military cooperation. Besides that, Japanese participation in any collective defense system is limited by the Constitution.

For Russia, the existence of the Security treaty, even despite Russian conceptual allergy to military blocks, does not represent a threat to security. Japan was never considered a real threat either to the USSR, or to Russia. The Soviet Union viewed Japan as a potential security threat, but mainly due to its hosting of American troops and its possible re-militarization. Although the territorial dispute with Japan is very important for Russia from the political point of view, it does not undermine Russian security in the traditional military meaning of this concept. The sane and sensible nature of Japanese policy is most likely to prevent its territorial dispute with Russia from taking the shape of a collision or a full-scale bilateral crisis. A deadlock on this issue could produce a negative effect on the economic interests of Russia; however, it is likely to come up only in the future, and indirectly. It would not be proper to say that China replaced the USSR in the list of potential threats, although the existence of a military alliance and military build up by Japan is more and more often justified by a Chinese potential threat to Japanese national and regional interests. The shared perception by Japan and the U. S. of China as a rising superpower not only strengthens their alliance but also persuades Tokyo to be more flexible in its relations with Russia.

For the security of Russia, Japanese military potential does not constitute a serious menace. It has an obvious defense character without any serious possibilities for force projection. It is difficult to imagine Japan using force to solve her territorial dispute with Russia. If in a territorial conflict around the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu dao), China and Japan would claim uninhabited territories, the Southern Kurils are de-facto Russian territory and are under the protection of Russian armed forces. If in a Sino-Japanese territorial conflict, extremist actions aimed at undermining the existing status quo provoke mutual force demonstrations, and maybe even a possible local conflict, any use of force in a Russian-Japanese conflict would be regarded as a violation of Russian sovereignty with all possible consequences.

A direct clash between Russian and Japanese armed forces is possible in two hypothetical situations. First, if Russia were to invade Japan, or attack Japanese ships in international waters. Second, in the case of a global conflict between Russia and the U. S., which would be a direct menace to the interests of Japan. For now, both scenarios are remote possibilities. It should not be proper to say that China replaced the USSR in the list of potential threats, but the existence of a military alliance and a military build up of Japan more and more often is justified by a Chinese potential threat to Japanese national and regional interests. Shared perceptions by Japan and the U. S. of China as a rising superpower not only strengthens their alliance but also persuades Tokyo to be more flexible in its relations with Russia.

In the framework of the new approach to Russia, Japan in 1997 declared a new approach to its relations with Moscow based on the principles of confidence, mutual benefit and long-term prospects. Leaders of the two countries in 1997-1998 had two informal meetings where President Boris Yeltsin promised “to make all efforts for signing peace treaty with Japan before year 2000.” The Japanese interpretation envisaged solving the territorial dispute between the two countries before that date. Analysis of Russia’s domestic situation clearly shows that this President, at least in the foreseeable future, is hardly in a position to solve this complicated problem. It is clear that a possible stalemate in this sensitive problem will seriously hamper bilateral relations, and demonstrate that the informal pattern of meetings not necessarily substitute for regular diplomacy.

Apparently the United States has preferred to maintain its key military and political alliances created to balance the Soviet threat during the cold war. NATO, together with the American-Japanese and American-South Korean military alliances in East Asia, allow the United States to preserve a favorable military balance at both the global and regional levels. This system of military alliances, headed by the United States, sustains the cohesion of the Western community and preserves the coordination of foreign and defense policies of the industrialized countries despite a sometimes fierce economic competition.

In bilateral relations, the United States and Russia carry a strong legacy of the cold war (including the built-in MAD inertia). On the other hand, both countries have accumulated some limited experience in military and political cooperation. The task is to reduce and to eliminate the competitive elements and to build up an institutionalized framework cooperation. This can be achieved through a step-by-step process, fully implementing the letter and the spirit of both the political and military elements of the Founding Act and other internationally approved documents.

While the Russian Federation will not be a major player in European affairs in the next decade, and will continue to be overwhelmed by the domestic economic problems, Russia will not accept the new status quo, if it is perceived to be detrimental to its national interests. Moscow may be searching for partners in Asia, including China, India and some Middle Eastern countries.

Russia and the US have to build not only a cooperative relationship to ensure peace and security in Europe, but also have to cooperate in the Asia Pacific. What if, for instance, we begin multilateral discussions among Russia, China, the U. S., and Japan to discuss TMD? We could invite the two Koreas, sending a signal to North Korea not to fool around. Can we buy them off? This might restore U. S. relations with China. It is especially important to draw China into negotiations. The fact is that Beijing encountered a challenge not only from the United States (BMD), but also from India. It cannot be excluded that the Chinese leadership will follow the path, as we did at one time, of building up their nuclear forces by beginning a massive deployment of MiRVed ICBM’s or of medium-range missiles. China’s new economic capabilities permit doing both. Are we interested in this?

It is possible to avoid a new geopolitical split of the world as a result of the outlined confrontation between the West on one side, and Russia, China and India on the other. The principle of consensus among the Security Council permanent members will be restored. Thus, mankind will enter the 21st century possessed with an effective mechanism of peacekeeping, based on the UN Charter, which will become a reliable basis for creation of an international security system.

Russia and the United States should look at the next arms control agreement not as simply a continued reduction of nuclear weapons within the model of mutual nuclear deterrence but as a transition point to abandon this model. Probably only by the year 2010 Russia and the United States may reach the end-point-the stage when the features of mutual nuclear deterrence can be completely abandoned, The new cooperative strategic nuclear relationship may not require an arms control treaty but agreements of a qualitatively different type, something looking more like an alliance that regulates positive interaction between close partners, if not full allies. That also will be the stage when the premises of the ABM Treaty may be radically reconsidered.

By that time it will become also possible to involve other nuclear powers into a legally binding arms control process. Deeper reductions will depend on a willingness by China and other official nuclear powers to join a multilateral regime, and success of international efforts to rollback the nuclear postures of unofficial nuclear powers (India, Pakistan, Israel).

In East Asia, the U. S. considers Russia neither as a threat to its national interests, nor as an economic competitor, which is related to the present not very high Russian involvement in the economic life of the region. As to the military aspects of security, here the attitude of Washington to its former antagonist is defined mainly by pragmatic considerations. The U. S. continues to consider Russia as the country maintaining a nuclear potential comparable with the American, and problems of strategic arms control are discussed only on the bilateral level, because they are not closely related to regional relations. In the sphere of conventional arms, including the naval balance, which always was the focal point for the Far East, the U. S. is not too concerned with the possibility of confronting a considerably weakened Russian military potential.

Russia recognizes the de facto role that the U. S. plays in the maintenance of stability of the region, and is itself also interested in maintenance of peace in the region. What is different today is that Russia has no significant opportunities for a more active participation in the regional processes. The social and economic stability of the Russian Far East has become the major security factor for Russia, which in the reform process in Russia became one of the most depressed regions in Russia. Before the 1990s, the security of the USSR was perceived exclusively within the framework of the military power balance. Today, the main threat for Russia proceeds from the consequences of those economic and social processes that have resulted from the unprecedented, by its scale, transition from a planned economy to the market.

The strategic stability of Russia can be guaranteed only by a combination of diplomatic, economic and military efforts in both European and Pacific directions. For Russia, which has always considered itself a part of the region, a not very active involvement in regional developments today will turn into missed economic opportunities, and in the future can result in an irreversible loss of hope for the return of the lost, but very much desired, status of a great power.