This paper believes，judicial independence is an inherent part of the modernization process of a feudal country. During the Chinese revolution of the 20^thcentury - from Sun Zhongshan’s republic to Mao Zedong’s liberation and Deng Xiaoping’s reforms，China did not establish a modern judicial system different fromthe traditional Chinese legal culture in nature，and the judicature did not become an independent，neutral and just regulative system up until now. On this background，it is important to deliberate on the present judicial system reforms in China，is it possible to make the man-made history shoulder the heaviness and difficulties of a realistic operation. The task of this article is to take on theproblems of reforming the judicial structure within the courts，and especially focuses on the abolishment and reconstruction of the Economic Courts.

The strong development directions of China’s market economy raises many historical problems to the judicial system，and it is left until today’s judicial reforms through sincere and serious consideration find a both reasonable and justanswer.

1. The instability of the economy in a transforming society is a challenge towards the government’s macro regulation ability，and the practice of China’sgovernment，especially the successful soft-landing in 1997，gave birth to theChinese macro economic regulation law. The practice of macro regulation produces new questions to be resolved by judicial proceedings.

2. The direction of the market economy reforms make it necessary to establish a Socialist market economy regulatory system to overcome the failure of the market，and thus resulted in the Chinese competition law. Anti-trust law and anti-unfair competition law also put new demands on the judiciary.

3. The development toward rule of law society indicates that the reforms of the Government’s administrative system cannot rely on internal efforts in orderto be accomplished；therefore，it is necessary to establish a regulatory systemto overcome the inefficiency of the government and to strengthen judicial enforcement. This is a new problem that both economic law and the judicial system has to face in the 21^st century.

This article maintains that the designers of large civil adjudication structure in China did not pay enough attention to problems arising from the strong economic development in China. After the abolishment of the Economic Tribunal andunder the present adjudication designs，the above-mentioned economic disputesbelong to a blind area in adjudication. First，civil adjudication is based on theremedies for the protection of rights and interests of property relations and personal relations between equal subjects，and it is too weak to establish a protective screen for the judicial protection of the application of macro regulationlaw and laws to prevent government inefficiency. Second，administrative adjudication deals with the improper exercise or non-exercise of specific administrative acts，and provides a balanced remedy to the counterpart to the administrationwhen their legal rights are infringed. However，this constitutes a backgrounddifference and limitation to the spirit of economic public interest litigation，and therefore it cannot provide sufficient judicial protection either in relationto economic imbalances within such areas as macro regulation，market failure andgovernment inefficiency.

In this situation，the only proper way to adapt to the strong development of the economy is to adjust，replenish and reform economic adjudication，positively and reliably exercise judicial discretionary powers，and strengthen judicialinterpretations. Furthermore，to resolve the legal difficulties in the application of economic law，and to establish，under market economy prerequisites，a judicial protective screen to overcome market failure and government inefficiency，are the only sensible measures and be good tidings the Chinese economic development. The abolishment of the Economic Courts deprives economic disputes of an economic theoretical significance（not common economic disputes）of their systematicbasis，and thus gives rise to the lack of proper judicial remedies. This doesnot meet the requirements of the process towards rule of law that is the direction of the Chinese economic development.

This article points out that the major characteristic of a large civil adjudication structure is its performing character. There are at least four problems that need be further discussed：

1. The large civil adjudication structure originates from an old ideal.

2. This structure is still lacks sufficient theoretical justification.

3. The object for the establishment of this structure is to settle doctrinal disputes.

4. The characteristic of a large civil adjudication structure is its performing character.

Directed towards the formation of large civil adjudication structures，thisarticle submits even more advanced questions to academic circles in China：Whycannot economic law provide sufficient theoretical support for economic adjudication？Considering this from the road of jurisprudence，how did Chinese economiclaw get lost？The development of jurisprudence has a correct road to rely on，but does Chinese jurisprudence have the method and ability to identify that way？To this the author makes the fundamental judgment that economic law has never been able to provide independent economic adjudication because of reasons of existing theoretical support，as there exists theoretical flaws and methodological incompleteness within economic law itself.

Finally，in the fourth part of this article the author maintains that we should reconstruct the economic adjudication mechanism. Under the requirements of the market economy，the theoretical basis for reconstructing the Economic Courtsis that we need a specific system to regulate the rights，power，benefit and obligation relationships and the dispute litigation management that arise from the process of overcoming market failure and government inefficiency. The rules ofeconomic procedure is special in their emphasis on establishing social public benefit litigation as the dominant mode，and supplemented by civil procedural rules and enacting systematic economic procedural rules，this will realize the spirit of economic law through procedural rules.

The scope of cases the Economic Courts should accept：

1. Disputes that arise from implementing the competition law，including cases against administrative monopolization，economic monopolization and unfair competition；

2. Disputes that arise from the enforcement of macro regulating laws，mainly including property，taxes，industrial polices and finance；

3. Disputes that arise from the enforcement of state investment and operation laws，including nationalization，private enterprises，the definition and protection of state assets；

4. Disputes that arise from the enforcement of economic supervision laws，including accounting，auditing and statistics；

Economic litigation that is based directly on public interest，such as consumer interest protection，environmental protection and government nonfeasance and tort cases.

The trial grades and regional setup of Economic Courts will be based on theprinciple of market integration，regulatory integration and the integration of judicial powers. It should minimize the social cost without damaging the presentjudicial system on large scale. The concrete solution is to set up an EconomicCourt in the Supreme People’s Court，and on a national scale divide the countryinto economic areas，and establish Economic Circuit Courts under the Supreme People’s Court，and to remove the organization and adjudication powers of economictribunals at the provincial level courts. Furthermore，reorganize the economictribunals of the intermediate people’s courts to accept first instance economiccases. The Economic Court of the Supreme People’s Court should accept second instance cases that are trans-regional and has national influence or controversialeconomic cases concerning foreign interests.

As a first step，one may formulate according to regional and economic divisions seven such Economic Circuit Courts of the Supreme People’s Court on a national scale：

1. Northeast Economic Circuit Court，the extent of its jurisdiction includes Heilongjiang，Jilin，Liaoning and Inner Mongolia，with its seat in Changchun.

2. North China Economic Circuit Court，the extent of its jurisdiction includes Beijing，Tianjin，Hebei，Shanxi and Shandong，with its seat in Shijiazhuang.

3. Northwest Economic Circuit Court，the extent of its jurisdiction includes Shaanxi，Gansu，Ningxia，Qinghai and Xinjiang，with its seat in Urumqi.

4. Southwest Economic Circuit Court，the extent of its jurisdiction includes Chongqing，Guizhou，Sichuan and Tibet，with its seat in Chongqing.

5. South China Economic Circuit Court，the extent of its jurisdiction includes Hainan，Guangdong，Guangxi and Yunnan，with its seat in Haikou.

6. East China Economic Circuit Court，the extent of its jurisdiction includes Shanghai，Jiangsu，Zhejiang，Fujian，with its seat in Shanghai.

7. South Central China Economic Circuit Court，the extent of its jurisdiction includes Henan，Anhui，Hunan，Hubei and Jiangxi with its seat in Wuhan.

The organizational system of Economic Circuit Courts is under the Supreme People’s Court，the judges are appointed and dismissed by the Standing Committeeof the NPC. Their funding comes from the Supreme People’s Court’s financingby the Central Government. The judge’s tenure is limited to 5 years and one fifthof the judges should be alternated every year.

The Economic Circuit Courts should accept economic cases of second instancein their respective jurisdictional zones，and cases of first instance concerning more than one province or concerning foreign interests.

Edited by Otto Malmgren